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Don't Call Me a Securities Law Groupie: 
The Rise and Possible Demise of the "Group 
Pleading" Protocol in lOb-5 Cases 
By William 0. Fisher* 
Corporations often speak through documents. Some, like press releases, 
may not identify an author. Others, like 10-Ks, bear the signatures of many 
who did not write them but sign as required by law. In many cases, groups 
of individuals, working together, prepare these documents. When such 
documents contain misstatements, plaintiffs may not know initially who 
wrote them. To address this difficulty, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Ninth and Second Circuits created a judge-made pleading protocol. This 
protocol permits plaintiffs to name officers, and in some cases directors, 
as defendants in securities fraud cases without pleading specific facts to 
show what role each of them played in creating the statements that plain-
tiffs challenge. 
The courts created this exception to particularity in fraud pleading be-
fore the Supreme Court decided Central Bank and before Congress passed 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the PSLRA or Act). 
This Article traces the history of this "group pleading" and considers 
whether it survives today. 
THE SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE 
The elements of a private lO(b) action for a misrepresentation in the 
purchase or sale of a security are: 
A representation made by the defendant (or for which the defendant 
is responsible under 1 O(b) substantive law); 
Of a material fact; 
That was false; 
* William 0. Fisher is a partner in the San Francisco office of Pillsbury Winthrop LLP. He 
is a member of the California and District of Columbia bars and a member of Pillsbury's 
Securities Litigation Group. Bea Rickels proofread and checked citations and quotations. 
The views expressed in this Article arc those of Mr. Fisher and should not be attributed to 
his firm or its clients. 
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Made when the defendant either knew the representation to be false 
or was reckless in not knowing that it was false (i.e., made with 
scienter); 
Made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security; 
On which the plaintiff relied; and 
Which caused damage to the plaintiff. 1 
This Article focuses on a rule allowing plaintiffs to plead the first element-
that a specific defendant ".made" a representation or is otherwise respon-
sible for it so as to be a proper lO(b) defendant. This is particularly a lO(b) 
issue because the other statutes that plaintiffs most frequently employ in 
private securities litigation-sections 11 and l 2(a)(2) of the Securities Act 
of 1933-define the circle of defendants without requiring that each of 
them "make" a false statement.2 
Private actions under section 1 O(b) are "fraud" actions for purposes of 
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 They are therefore 
subject to that Rule's requirement that, "[i]n all averments of fraud ... , 
the circumstances constituting fraud ... shall be stated with particularity. " 4 
I. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). When a plaintiff bases a lO(b) case on 
an omission, the elements become: 
A failure by the defendant to disclose; 
A material fact; 
When the defendant was under a duty to disclose that fact; 
At a time when the defendant either knew the undisclosed fact or was reckless in not 
knowing it; 
In connection with the purchase or sale of a security; 
When the plaintiff was relying on the defendant to disclose according to the defendant's 
duty; and 
Which caused damage to the plaintiff. 
See id. 
2. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Section 11 lists those who may 
be sued for a material misrepresentation or omission in a registration statement. They include 
all who sign the registration statement, all directors of the issuer on the date the registration 
statement is filed, all directors-elect whom the registration statement identifies, and all the 
underwriters for the issue. See id. § 77k(a). There is no requirement that each defendant must 
himself have written a misrepresentation. 
Section 12(a)(2) creates liability for all who sell or offer to sell a security by means of a 
prospectus or oral communication that contains a material misrepresentation or omits to 
state a material fact necessary to avoid misleading by the words the prospectus or oral com-
munication contain. See id.§ 77l(a)(2). Under Pi.nter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988), the defendants 
include those who pass title to the securities so sold as well as those who "solicit" the sales. 
See id. at 643. As with section 11, section l 2(a)(2) does not in terms require that each defendant 
himself author a misstatement. 
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
4. Id. Cases in both the Ninth and Second Circuits acknowledge that Rule 9(b) applies to 
claims brought under section IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. See Mills v. Polar Molec-
ular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993) (''A Rule I Ob-5 plaintiff must comply with 
Rule 9(b) .... ");Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987) 
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In cases in which plaintiffs sue multiple defendants for fraud, the com-
plaint must set forth particular facts to show each defendant's role. A 
"claimant usually may not group all wrongdoers together in a single set 
of allegations. Rather, the claimant is required to make specific and sepa-
rate allegations against each defendant."5 In particular, "many courts ... 
require the plaintiff to specify which defendant made each of the alleged 
misrepresentations. "6 
Where the misstatements appear in certain types of documents that 
plaintiffs believe were written by groups, some courts allow plaintiffs to 
link certain defendants to alleged misrepresentations simply by pleading 
that the defendants were part of the "group" that likely put the challenged 
documents together. Instead of pleading that defendant A actually au-
thored an offending statement in, for example, a press release, plaintiffs 
can include A as a defendant on allegations that A occupied a certain po-
sition at the issuer. The court may then under "group pleading" presume 
that A, because of his or her position, participated in drafting the press 
release. Without any further facts, "group pleading" allows plaintiffs to 
allege that defendant A "made" the challenged statement and so plead 
the first element of a 1 O(b) case against this defendant. "Group pleading" 
is thus an exception to the normal rule that a plaintiff must plead particular 
facts to connect each defendant to an alleged fraud. 
Judges created "group pleading." Congress did not include group plead-
ing in any provision of the Securities Exchange Act. Federal circuits and 
district courts formulate the concept in different ways. Courts in the Ninth 
and Second Circuits provide the most elaborate formulations. Although 
other courts have articulated variations, 7 this Article focuses mainly on 
decisions in those two circuits. 
This Article divides into five sections. First, it traces the development of 
"group pleading" in the Ninth and Second Circuits. Second, it discusses 
two abuses of the protocol-its use by some courts as a rule of substantive 
law rather than simply a pleading shortcut, and its misapplication in some 
decisions to the scienter element. Third, turning to the effect of Central 
Bank, this Article investigates the impact of the Ninth and Second Circuits' 
("Rule 9(b), which applies to securities actions brought under Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5, 
requires particularity in pleading the circumstances constituting fraud."). 
5. 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE§ 9.03[1] [f] (3d ed. 2000) (foot-
note omitted). 
6. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 1297, at 97 (2d ed. Supp. 2000). 
7. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(relying in part on the Wool decision discussed ir!fra notes 8-12 and accompanying text, and 
in part on In re Storage Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 630 F. Supp. I 072, I 076-77 (D. Colo. 1986), 
which in turn references the Somerville decision discussed in the text accompanying note 70); 
In re Sahlen & Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 773 F. Supp. 342, 361-62 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (citing to 
both Ninth and Second Circuit authorities but mixing up "group pleading" with "control 
person" liability). 
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definitions of primary liability on their respective "group pleading" rules. 
The fourth topic is a much debated issue-the effect of the PSLRA on 
"group pleading." The last section discusses whether the assumptions be-
hind this pleading device reflect the real world of corporate disclosure. 
WOOL v. TANDEM: THE NINTH CIRCUIT VERSION 
Tandem Computers Inc. (Tandem) developed and produced multiple 
processor computer systems. On December 8, 1982, Tandem announced 
the restatement of its fiscal year 1982 revenue and earnings. Its stock 
dropped and shareholders filed a class action. 8 
Plaintiffs named as defendants not only the company but also three 
officers: the President/CEO, the Senior Vice President/COO, and the 
Vice President/Controller. The complaint did not, however, allege that 
any one of these officers was responsible for any particular false number 
in any identified financial statement.9 The individual defendants moved 
to dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs' failure to link each defendant specifically 
to the alleged fraud violated Rule 9(b). 10 
The district court dismissed the claim against the individual defendants 
without prejudice and then granted summary judgment to the company 
8. Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1987). The court summa-
rized the alleged improper revenue recognition in this way: 
Tandem's management, toward the end of each quarter, authorized shipments of equip-
ment to carrier warehouses even though material conditions of sale remained unsatis-
fied. Tandem's employees prepared shipping documents which, on their face, indicated 
direct shipment to customers. In reality, the supposedly "sold" equipment was merely 
transferred to a warehouse and remained under Tandem's control. These and other 
practices permitted Tandem to book revenue from incomplete sales. 
Id. at 1435. 
9. The complaint attributed financial announcements to "Tandem," alleged that "Tan-
dem's management" had employed certain procedures that generated revenue that the com-
pany should not have recognized, and then referred to "defendants" in the charging para-
graphs. See Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws and Pendant State Law 
Claims, '11'1116-18, 23, 30-32 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 1984) (No. C 84 20656) (on file with the The 
Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law). Nowhere did the complaint detail 
what role any individual defendant played in creating the financials. 
10. Previous Ninth Circuit authority held that, in fraud cases involving multiple defen-
dants, plaintiffs must specifically plead the role of each defendant in the fraud. See, e.g., Se-
megen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 73 l (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming dismissal of complaint against 
certain defendants in lO(b) case by holding, "the plaintiffs have failed to plead their claims 
against [these defendants] with the requisite particularity. Plaintiffs have done nothing more 
than set forth conclusory allegations of fraud ... punctuated by a handful of neutral facts. 
The absence of particularity with respect to the alleged fraudulent participation of [these 
defendants] in the coal venture scheme and the absence of specification of any times, dates, 
places or other details of that alleged fraudulent involvement is contrary to the fundamental 
purposes of Rule 9(b).") (citations omitted). 
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on the ground that the named plaintiff could not establish the requisite 
injury. 11 The Ninth Circuit reversed. Addressing the argument that the 
complaint did not attribute particular fraudulent statements or acts to each 
individual defendant, the Ninth Circuit found the complaint sufficient and 
inaugurated its "group pleading" era with these words: 
In cases of corporate fraud where the false or misleading information 
is conveyed in prospectuses, registration statements, annual reports, 
press releases, or other "group-published information," it is reason-
able to presume that these are the collective actions of the officers. 
Under such circumstances, a plaintiff fulfills the particularity require-
ment of Rule 9(b) by pleading the misrepresentations with particu-
larity and where possible the roles of the individual defendants in the 
misrepresentations. 
Wool clearly satisfied this requirement. The individual defendants 
are a narrowly defined group of officers who had direct involvement 
not only in the day-to-day affairs of Tandem in general but also in 
Tandem's financial statements in particular. 12 
ELABORATION OF WOOL'S RULE 
The application of Wool raised two principal questions. The first was 
who the "group" included. The second was which corporate communi-
cations were "group published." 
WHO JS WITHIN THE "GROUP"? 
All individual Wool defendants were officers. The opinion did not ad-
dress whether outside directors could ever be "group pleaded" into a l O(b) 
action. A little over one year after Wool, the Ninth Circuit decided Blake v. 
Dierdoiff,13 holding that the "presumption of collective action when there 
is misleading 'group published information' is equally applicable to 
members of a board of directors" as it is to officers. 14 Lower courts pro-
ceeded to struggle with this notion, particularly as it applied to outside 
directors. Neither the law nor practical experience suggested that outside 
directors were so deeply involved in a company's affairs as to formulate 
11. Wool, 818 F.2d at 1436. 
12. Id. at 1440 (citations omitted). Because this pleading protocol affects only one ele-
ment-the connection between the defendant and allegedly misleading statements-and 
because it does so by a presumption that the defendant was part of a group that published 
the statement, it is more properly called the "group published information presumption." 
For convenience, this Article uses the shorter phrase "group pleading." 
13. 856 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1988). 
14. Id. at 1369. 
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the text of corporate disclosures, or even approve the language of those 
disclosures. 15 
As district courts sorted out when "group pleading" applied to outside 
directors, the decisions ran the gamut. Some seemed almost randomly to 
apply "group pleading" to all directors. 16 Others focused on the directors' 
access to information;l7 membership on board committees; 1B involvement 
in day-to-day corporate management; 19 or some disjunctive test based 
upon the degree to which the directors participated in management or 
had some "special relationship" with the corporation, such as actual par-
ticipation in the drafting of offending documents. 2o 
15. The American Law Institute's Principles ef Corporate Governance concluded that "the 
board can normally satisfy the requirements of present statutes without either actively man-
aging or directing the management of the corporation, as long as it oversees management 
and retains the decisive voice on major corporate actions." 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE § 3.02 cmt. a (American Law Institute 1994). 
16. See, e.g., Robbins v. Hometown Buffet, Inc., No. 94-1655:}, 1995 WL 908194, at *5 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 1995) ("[T]he group publishing doctrine may apply to defendant officers 
and directors merely by virtue of their status in the corporation, so long as the complaint also 
makes an effort to allege, where possible, how the defendants' status as officers or directors 
make them responsible for group published information.") (emphasis added). 
17. See, e.g., XOMA Corp. Sec. Litig., [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 96,491, at 92,160 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 1991) ("Outside directors, although almost 
by definition excluded from the day-to-day management of a corporation, can fall within the 
group pleading presumption when, by virtue of their status or a special relationship with the 
corporation, they have access to information more akin to a corporate insider.") (citation 
omitted); In re Epitope, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
~ 97,263, at 95,188 (D. Or. Nov. 30, 1992) (following XOMA). 
18. See, e.g., In re National Health Labs. Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ~97,677, at 97,136 (S.D. Cal.July 2, 1993) ("[M]embership on the (audit or 
executive] committees could provide the link or special relationship necessary for application 
of the presumption."); Perskyv. Turley, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
~ 96,483, at 92, 130 (D. Ariz. Dec. 19, 1991) (noting participation on Executive and Audit 
Review Committees, review of 10-Qs, and signing 10-Ks). 
19. See, e.g., In re Gupta Corp. Sec. Litig., [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
~ 98,689, at 92,227 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 1995) ("Where outside directors participate in the 
management of the part of the company allegedly involved in fraud ... , the group pleading 
presumption may apply."); In re Ross Sys. Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 98,363, at 90,496 (N.D. Cal.July 21, 1994) (dismissing claims against outside 
directors with leave to amend "to allege day-to-day management"); O'Sullivan v. Trident 
Microsystems, Inc., [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~98,116, at 
98,913 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 31, 1994) (dismissing outside directors because "plaintiffs provide[d] 
no factual basis to establish involvement of [these] directors in Trident's 'day-to-day 
management.'"). 
20. See, e.g., In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 855 F. Supp. I 086, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("By 
definition, outside directors do not participate in the corporation's day-to-day affairs. Thus, 
the doctrine may be invoked as to outside directors only if they are 'involved in the day-to-
day management of those parts of the corporation involved in the [alleged] fraud,' or if they 
otherwise have a special relationship or status with the corporation.") (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted), ajf'd, 95 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1996); In re RasterOps Corp. Sec. Litig., [1994-
1995 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 98,467, at 91, 194 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 
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The Ninth Circuit settled this issue with its In re GlenFed Inc. Securities 
Litigation21 decision in July 1995. GlenFed recognized the limited role that 
outside directors play and constrained the circumstances in which "group 
pleading" could bring them into a case: 
Plaintiffs contend that "the Wool 'group published information' pre-
sumption is applicable to outside directors where the plaintiffs plead 
that the outside directors hold positions on audit, executive and other 
committees that are responsible for overseeing the corporation's fi-
nancial and disclosure activities." We disagree .... The "group pub-
lished information" presumption is grounded in reasonableness-and 
it is not reasonable to presume in every case ... that a "corporate 
scheme to defraud was collectively devised by the [outside] director 
defendants." To rely upon the "group published information" pre-
sumption, Plaintiffs' complaint must contain allegations that an out-
side director either participated in the day-to-day corporate activities, 
or had a special relationship with the corporation, such as partici-
pation in preparing or communicating group information at partic-
ular times. 22 
A director's membership on board committees would not suffice.23 Sign-
ing corporate documents would not suffice.24 Using connections to help 
1994) ("The group pleading rule may be used as to outside directors only if they participate 
in the daily affairs of those parts of the corporation involved in the alleged fraud, or otherwise 
have a special relationship with the corporation."). There are other decisions focusing on 
director involvement in drafting or disseminating documents or other "special relationships" 
with the corporation. See In re Medeva Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) '1] 98,323, at 90,241 (C.D. Cal.June 3, 1994) ("[l]n order to invoke the 'group 
published information' presumption against an outside director, the plaintiffs must allege that 
the director participated in the drafting of the fraudulent documents or 'otherwise enjoyed 
[a] special relationship' with the corporation."); Haltman v. Aura Sys., Inc., 844 F. Supp. 
544, 548 (C.D. Cal. 1993) ("The rules with respect to pleading claims against an outside 
director require Plaintiffs to allege a special relationship or status with the corporation."); In 
re Digital Microwave Corp. Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
'IJ 97 ,044, at 94,594 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1992) (denying motions to dismiss and holding, 
"[e]ach of the defendants acted as a Director of[the issuer] ... and is alleged to have directly 
participated in the management of the company, as well as the dissemination of false infor-
mation regarding the financial condition and status of [the issuer]."). 
21. 60 F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 1995). 
22. Id. at 593 (citations omitted). 
23. See id. ("Merely because the complaint identifies a corporation's outside directors, 
various committee assignments, and generic responsibilities for every committee does not 
mean that the presumption of 'group published information' is applicable."). 
24. Both pre- and post-GlenFed decisions so held. See Pre-GlenFed: In re Gupta Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 900 F. Supp. 1217, 1241 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (acknowledging decisions holding that "the 
mere fact that an outside director signed a group published document does not make the 
outside director liable for the contents of the document."); In re Ross Sys. Sec. Litig., [1994-
1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 98,363, at 90,496 (N.D. Cal.July 21, 1994) 
("[C]laims that the director merely signed some of the group published documents are not 
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the issuer with an occasional business problem would not suffice. 25 Access 
to nonpublic information would not suffice.26 Receiving copies of docu-
ments before release to the public and generally "reviewing and approv-
ing" the documents would not suffice.27 Nor could plaintiffs apply "group 
sufficient to meet group pleading requirements."); In re Medeva Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~98,323, at 90,241 (G.D. Cal.June 3, 1994) ("[T]he 
only specific allegation against Sinclair linking him to the fraud ... is his signature on the 
1992 Registration Statement and Prospectus. This allegation, by itself, does not satisfy the 
elements required to invoke the 'group published information' presumption .... ")(citation 
omitted); XOMA Corp. Sec. Litig., [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
~ 96,491, at 92, 160-61 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 1991) (granting directors' motion to dismiss, and 
noting "[plaintiffs'] only allegations against these defendants is that they signed some of the 
group published information. However, there is no allegation that these directors participated 
in the drafting of these documents, or otherwise enjoyed any 'special relationship' with 
XOMA. The allegations are insufficient to bring these outside directors within the group 
pleading presumption."). See also Post-GlenFed: Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995) ("[A]n outside director does not become liable for the contents of a group pub-
lished document merely by signing it."); Strassman v. Fresh Choice, Inc., No. C-95-20017 
RPA, 1995 WL 743728, at *14 (N. D. Cal. Dec. 7, 1995) ("[T]he fact that [the outside 
directors] signed several Fresh Choice documents filed with the SEC does not make them 
liable for the contents of the documents."); Picard Chem. Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo 
Co., 940 F. Supp. 1101, 1127 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (same; relying on authority from Ninth 
Circuit); In re Valence Tech. Sec. Litig., No. C95-20459, 1996 WL 67326, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 13, 1996) (same). But see In re ValuJet, Inc., Sec. Litig., 984 F. Supp. 1472, 1478 (N.D. 
Ga. 1997) (relying on Blake v. Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1988), not citing to GlenFed, 
and holding "[u]nder the 'group publication doctrine,' the Plaintiffs may satisfy the pleading 
requirements by alleging that an individual defendant signed a publication containing 
misstatements"). 
It is unclear how Howard v. Everex Systems, Inc., 228 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000), will affect 
these authorities. See infia notes 139-43 and accompanying text. 
25. See Valence Tech., 1996 WL 67326, at *6 (dismissing director who was also CEO of his 
own company even though plaintiffs alleged that he arranged to have personnel of his own 
company assist the issuer in setting up foreign operations). 
26. See Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031, 1041 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (dismissing directors 
because the "allegations do not sufficiently describe the outside directors day-to-day involve-
ment in the corporation, but rather attempt to include these directors by virtue of their titles 
and boilerplate 'access to information' language."); In re Interactive Network, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
948 F. Supp. 91 7, 921 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("Extending the doctrine to cover outside directors 
who, while not involved in the day-to-day workings of a corporation, are privy to inside 
information does not merely make it easier for plaintiffs without information about the inner 
workings of an organization to defeat a motion to dismiss. Instead, it extends the group of 
possible defendants liable in I Ob-5 cases beyond those who might be responsible for making 
the decision."); Strassman, 1995 WL 743728, at *13-*14 (granting motion to dismiss even 
though plaintiffs alleged that the directors "had access to [the issuer's] internal operating 
plan, budget, forecasts and reports."). For a similar pre-GlenFed case, see Gupta Corp., 900 F. 
Supp. at 1242 ("Conclusory allegations that an outside director had access to corporate 
documents likewise do not demonstrate the day-to-day involvement with corporate affairs 
necessary to establish liability under the group pleading presumption."). 
27. See In re Oak Tech. Sec. Litig., No. 96-20552 SW, 1997 WL 448168, at *I I (N.D. Cal. 
July l, 1997) ("Plaintiffs further allege that [the outside directors], as members of the Audit 
Committee ... , 'reviewed and approved the issuance of [the] false financial statements ... .' 
However, Plaintiffs fail to allege these Defendants' specific roles in the review and ap-
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pleading" to outside directors with boilerplate allegations of day-to-day 
involvement in the company or its documents,28 more specific assertions 
that they participated in bi-monthly lunches devoted to company strat-
egy, 29 creative pleading that directors were "in solidarity" with a CE0,30 
or charges that the directors generally controlled the overall direction of 
the issuer. 31 About the only way to survive an outside director motion to 
dismiss in the Ninth Circuit after GlenFed has been to plead specifically the 
director's actual involvement in the preparation of the very documents that 
contain the misrepresentations or are misleading because of omissions.32 
proval .... ") (citation omitted). See also Pre-GlenFed decisions: In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 
855 F. Supp. I 086, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (dismissing claims against outside director even 
though plaintiffs pleaded that he "was privy to the contents of ... quarterly and annual 
reports, press releases and presentations to securities analysts prior to their issuance, and had 
the ability to prevent their issuance or cause them to be corrected."); In re Ross Systems, 
[1994-1995 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 90,496 (dismissing directors in 
face of plaintiffs' allegation that the directors "controlled the contents of [the issuer's] 
alleged misrepresentations through receiving copies of reports and press releases before 
distribution"). 
28. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) '1] 99,325, at 95,963 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996). 
29. See In re RasterOps Corp. Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH)'IJ 98,467, at 91,194 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 1994) (denying a motion to dismiss, but noting, 
"[p)laintiff's allegation concerning attendance at bi-monthly lunch meetings [at which the 
company's financial condition was discussed] will not do the trick ... twice a month does 
not mean day-to-clay."). The court in In re Splash Technology Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C99-
00109 SBA, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15370 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2000), similarly rejected 
allegations that a director was uncommonly involved in clay-to-day operations: 
[Ilhe complaint alleges that Berger was in"frequent contact" with ... two of Splash's 
top executives, received copies of Splash's internal operating and budget reports circu-
lated to executives, signed the Prospectus and Registration Statement, signed a ... 
Merger Agreement between Splash and Radius that obligated Splash officers to present 
detailed budgets and projections to Splash directors ... , received copies of the allegedly 
false reports and press releases prior to their issuance, and ... was appraised by weekly 
and monthly reports of the status of orders for and sales of every Splash product. These 
allegations, however, still do not rise to the level of establishing the requisite participation 
in Splash's day-to-day activities. 
Id. at *46-*47 (citation omitted). 
30. See Strassman, 1995 WL 743728, at* 13-* 14 (granting outside directors' motion to dis-
miss, despite plaintiffs' claim that they "acted in 'total solidarity'" with CEO). 
31. See id. at *14 ("The allegation that [the outside directors], along with [the CEO), 
controlled the company's financial and strategic operations and other management decisions 
does not address whether they were involved in the 'day-to-day' operations of [the issuer)."). 
32. Just how specific the allegations must be may depend on the judge. Compare the 
cases discussed in note 27 with In re RasterOps Corp., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 98,467, where the court denied a motion to dismiss and held that, 
"plaintiff's allegations that the outside directors participated in the preparation of documents 
containing the alleged misstatements indicate a 'special relationship' with the corporation 
sufficient to invoke the group pleading presumption." Id. at 91,194. Also, compare those 
cases to In re Gupta Corp. Sec. Litig., [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 98,689 
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The rules for outside directors provided a model for application of the 
"group pleading" presumption to outside advisors. In Moore v. Kayport Pack-
age Express, lnc.,33 the Ninth Circuit held, in a limited partnership context, 
that outside professionals could not be swept into a case on a group pub-
lication presumption because "unlike the situation in r+bol, the accountant, 
lawyer and stockbroker defendants in this case are not a narrowly defined 
group of corporate officers or directors who are alleged to have had day-
to-day control over the fraudulent entities or their finances." 34 
Relying on this same rationale-that defendants who did not participate 
in day-to-day management could not be part of the "group"-courts held 
that underwriters and consultants were not properly named as defendants 
by "group pleading."35 Venture capitalists and other large shareholders, 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 1995), where the court denied a motion to dismiss and noted: 
plaintiffs allege that [the outside directors) (1) signed [the issuer's] 1993 Annual Report 
on Form 10-K; (2) were members of the audit and compensation committees ... ; 
(3) were informed of [the) improper revenue recognition practices ... ; (4) attended 
Board and audit committee meetings at which large transactions with revenue recog-
nition issues were discussed and approved by Board members; (5) controlled the contents 
of [the issuer's] financial reports, press releases and presentations to securities analysts; 
(6) received copies of [the) financial reports and press releases prior to or shortly after 
their issuance; and (7) had the ability and opportunity to prevent the issuance of false 
statements .... By alleging that [the outside directors], as members of [the] audit com-
mittee, directly approved the allegedly fraudulent accounting practices that form the 
basis of the [complaint], plaintiffs have successfully asserted day-to-day management of 
the part of the Company involved in the alleged fraud. 
Id. at 92,227-28. Lastly, in In re Reliance Sec. Litig., 91 F. Supp. 2d 706 (D. Del. 2000), the court 
denied a motion to dismiss, citing GlenFed and other cases from outside the Ninth Circuit. See 
id. at 720. The court held: 
[a]lthough the complaint does not attribute any specific misstatement to these defen-
dants, the wrong complained of-that the Company maintained declining loan loss 
reserves as its loan loss rates increased-is the kind of matter that these defendants may 
have been personally responsible for overseeing .... These defendants allegedly prepared, 
approved, or reviewed the Company's financial statements containing material over-
statements to its net income. 
Id. (emphasis added). Unless courts require a high degree of specificity, form allegations that 
directors participated in preparing documents will undermine the principle that outside di-
rectors should not be "group pleaded" into a case absent exceptional circumstances. 
33. 885 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1989). 
34. Id. at 540. 
35. Underwriters have been held to be outside the scope of "group pleading." See In re 
Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1411 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of underwriters 
and quoting the outside director standard from GlenFed indicating the plaintiff "cannot rely 
on the group published information exception to Rule 9(b) because the [complaint] contains 
no allegations that [the] ... underwriters 'either participated in the day-to-day corporate 
activities, or had a special relationship with the corporation, such as participation in preparing 
or communicating group information at particular times.'") (quoting GlenFed, 60 F.3d at 593). 
See also Krieger v. Gast, No. 4:99-CV-86, 2000 WL 288442, at *10 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 21, 
2000) (stating that plaintiffs could not rely on the "group published information" presumption 
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even those with representatives on the board, were also generally outside 
the "group" absent specific charges that they participated in the issuer's 
daily corporate activities or that they had in fact drafted the challenged 
documents.36 
to hold liable the investment banker for an insider group where plaintiffs alleged misrepre-
sentations in connection with the insiders' acquisition of control by merging the issuer and 
shell corporation; citing primarily to Ninth Circuit authority in earlier "group pleading" 
discussion); O'Sullivan v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) iJ 98,116, at 98,914 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 31, 1994) ("[I]he group pleading pre-
sumption does not apply to the underwriters."); In re MDC Holdings Sec. Litig., 7 54 F. Supp. 
785, 795 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (dismissing individuals at Drexel as to issuer statements because 
"Drexel was the underwriter for MDC. The position held by these parties in relation to 
MDC is not analogous to that held by the officers or directors of MDC. That is, they did 
not have direct involvement in MDC's day-to-day affairs or its publications .... Plaintiffs 
have not alleged a special relationship between MDC and Drexel."). 
Courts have also held consultants outside "group pleading." In In re Aetna Inc. Sec. litig., 34 
F. Supp. 2d 935 (E.D. Pa. 1999), the court dismissed the former chairman and CEO of the 
acquired company who joined the board of the acquiring company, acted as a consultant to 
the acquiring company, and was a member of its Finance Committee. See id. at 949-50. 
Relying on GlenFed, the court found that the plaintiffs "failed to allege any facts to support 
their allegations that [this defendant] was involved in the day-to-day operations of Aetna 
after the ... merger .... " Id. at 950. Similarly, in Rubin u. Trimble, No. C-95-4353 MMC, 
1997 WL 227956 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1997), the court dismissed with prejudice claims against 
a director and consultant even though the complaint alleged generally that each defendant 
"'reviewed, edited, commented upon and participated in the preparation and dissemination 
of (the] August 1995 Prospectus."' Id. at *20. The court noted, "[n]owhere does the com-
plaint specifically allege that [this defendant] participated in [the issuer's] day-to-day activities 
... or had any other 'special relationship' with [the company] .... " Id. See also In re National 
Health Labs. Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)iJ 97 ,677, at 97 ,136 
(S.D. Cal. July 2, 1993) (dismissing claim against firm providing public relations services to 
issuer). 
36. In In re Interactive Network, Inc. Sec. litig., 948 F. Supp. 91 7 (N.D. Cal. 1996), the share-
holder defendant owned between 25% and 37% of the issuer's stock and had a representative 
on the board. The court granted the motions to dismiss both the shareholder and the board 
representative, stating: 
plaintiffs have failed to plead circumstances sufficient to support a finding that [these] 
defendants were involved in the day-to-day running of [the issuer]. While they have 
detailed ... the financial arrangements between [the shareholder and the issuer], and 
have stated that these arrangements led to [the shareholder) receiving a seat on (the 
issuer's] board, they have failed to show that [the shareholder] took an active role in 
[the issuer's] daily affairs. Plaintiffs may have alleged that [these] defendants had the 
capacity to participate in the day-to-day operations of [the issuer), but they have failed 
to allege that they actually did so. 
Id. at 922. See also In re Splash Tech. Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C99-00l09 SBA, 2000 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15370, at *48-*49 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2000) ("Plaintiffs allege that the 
group published information doctrine extends to Radius ... since it shared a special rela-
tionship with Splash by virtue of ( l) its ownership of 20% of Splash stock, (2) Splash being a 
Radius 'spin-off,' (3) the majority of Splash officers being former Radius officers, and 
(4) Radius' dependence upon its Splash stock for its survival .... Plaintiffs present no authority 
for the proposition that a shareholder who is not also either an officer or director may be 
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The day-to-day involvement test, however, does not serve well in deter-
mining which officers should be included within a "group" presumably 
preparing corporate communications. vvvol held that plaintiffs properly 
named the President/CEO, the Senior Vice President/COO, and the Vice 
liable under the group-published information doctrine. In addition, the example Glenfed II 
gave for evidence of a special relationship-participation in preparing or communicating 
group information at particular times-is absent here. Plaintiffs do not allege with particularity 
any statement in which Radius played a role."); Stac Electronics, 89 F.3d at 1411 (affirming 
dismissal of venture capital defendants among others and agreeing with the district court 
that "group pleading" was not available against those defendants); Picard Chem. Inc. Profit 
Sharing Plan v. Perrigo Co., 940 F. Supp. 1101, 1128-29 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (Hillman de-
fendants "exerted their influence or control over the Company because, as a group, they 
controlled 20.8% of [the issuer's) common stock, had determined a majority of directors 
through the October 1993 offering pursuant to a 1988 Hillman Subscription Agreement, 
controlled two outside directors ... , and generally kept in continuous communication with 
[the issuer's] corporate officials during the class period," yet holding nonetheless that the 
"group pleading presumption does not apply to any of the main Hillman defendants."); 
Strassman v. Fresh Choice, Inc., No. C-95-20017 RPA, 1995 WL 743728, at *14 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 7, 1995) ("Plaintiffs allege that the group pleading doctrine applies to Rosewood, as the 
largest Fresh Choice shareholder, because Adams is both a principal of Rosewood and a 
member of the Fresh Choice Board of Directors. The group pleading doctrine may be applied 
to a venture capital firm if the plaintiff can show that the firm's agent participated in the 
preparation and dissemination of company documents containing misrepresentations. How-
ever, ... Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that Adams prepared or disseminated any 
of the allegedly false or misleading Fresh Choice documents.") (citations omitted); In re Ross 
Sys. Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,363, at 90,496 
(N.D. Cal. July 21, 1994) (dismissing general partners of venture capital firms that sat on the 
issuer's board); Gupta Corp., 900 F. Supp. at 1241 ("These claims against Novell [and] Rekhi 
[a Novell Executive Vice President and a director of the issuer] ... are simply conclusory 
allegations unsupported by assertions of specific day-to-day involvement in the management 
of [the issuer). As such, the allegations are insufficient to bring Rekhi ... and Novell, a 
minority shareholder, within the gambit [sic] of the group pleading doctrine."); In re Proxima 
Corp. Sec. Litig., [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,236, at 99,623 
(S.D. Cal. May 3, 1994) (holding "group pleading" not applicable to venture capital defen-
dants who collectively owned over 50% of issuer's stock prior to IPO); In re Quarterdeck 
Office Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 854 F. Supp. 1466, 1474-75 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (granting motion 
for judgment on the pleadings because plaintiffs failed to allege that the venture capitalists 
were involved in the day-to-day operations of the issuer, despite plaintiffs' allegations that 
defendants saw reports prior to publication); O'Sullivan, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 98,913 (dismissing both 9.5% stockholder and its representative on 
the board on basis that the stockholder was "not the largest shareholder of [the issuer). 
Moreover, plaintiffs have alleged no facts to establish that [the representative on the board] 
has participated in the preparation and dissemination of the registration statement or other 
documents that contained alleged misrepresentations."); In reJenny Craig Sec. Litig., [1992-
1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 97,337, at 95,724 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 1992) 
(dismissing claims against two institutional investors with representatives on the board; "be-
cause each of the [representatives] was only a director of [the issuer] and only one of seven, 
and each of [the institutional investors] owned no more than four percent of [the issuer's] 
stock, compared with the Craigs' ownership of 61 to 7 5 percent, the rules of group pleading 
do not apply"); In re Genentech, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ii 94,544, at 93,482 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 1989) (dismissing minority shareholder even 
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President/Controller on the theory that these officers were a "narrowly 
defined group ... who had direct involvement not only in the day-to-day 
affairs of Tandem in general but also in Tandem's financial statements in 
particular."37 That second qualification-presumptive participation in the 
preparation of the offending communications-was critical. Particularly 
as plaintiffs work out from the core of top officers38 to name as defendants 
virtually any officer who sold what plaintiffs consider to be a significant 
amount of stock during the class period, it becomes less and less likely that 
a named officer actually had any role in drafting or disseminating the 
misrepresentations. The day-to-day involvement test does not discriminate 
though it had a representative on the board, because "stock ownership, without more, is 
manifestly not enough to establish direct involvement in corporate 'day-to-day' affairs"), 
deciding motions for reconsideration and clarification on other matters, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. ~ 94,813 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, \ 989). But see Pre-GlenFed cases: National Health 
Labs., [1993 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 97, 136 (denying motion to dismiss 
by corporate defendants after plaintiffs argued that group published information presumption 
applied, where each "had a controlling stock interest in [the issuer] and shared directors. 
These entities allegedly profited from the fraud by obtaining over a billion dollars through 
sale of ... stock."); Klein v. King, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
~ 95,002, at 95,609-10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 1990) (holding CEO of a 20% shareholder who 
sat on issuer's board was a proper "group pleading" defendant, and denying motion to 
dismiss his shareholding company). A recent case reaches a similar result. See In re Imperial 
Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., [2000 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 90,965, at 
94,233 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2000) ("Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Snavely and Shug-
erman had a special relationship with SPF. ICI[I) owned approximately 47% ofSPF's stock. 
SPF stated in its .... Form 10-K ... that 'altough [sic] the percentage ownership by ICU is 
less than 50%, ICU will continue to be able to control the election of at least a majority of 
the ... Board ... and to determine all corporate actions for the foreseeable future.' Through 
its control of SP!<~ ICI[l) was able to elect its chairman, Wayne Snavely, as chairman ofSPF's 
Board ... , [and to elect) Shugerman to SPF's board .... [TJ he sum of these factors ... is 
that Snavely and Shugerman had a special relationship with SPF exceeding that of a typical 
outside director. As a result, Snavely and Shugerman are subject to the group published 
information doctrine for statements made by SPF.") (citation omitted). 
37. Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987). 
38. In some cases, it seems odd to presume that even all senior officers participated in 
drafting the asserted misstatements. In re Marion 1\4.errell Dow Inc., Sec. Litig., [1993 Transfer 
Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 97,776 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 4, 1993), concerned allegedly 
false statements assuming FDA approval of a prescription drug for over-the-counter use 
despite knowledge of adverse reactions by patients. The decision denies motions to dismiss 
by, among others: the Executive Vice President for Research and Development, who was 
also a director; the Executive Vice President, who was also the President of Marion Merrell 
Dow Research Institute and a director; the CFO, who was also a director; and the Vice 
President/Controller. See id. at 97,765-67, 97,773. The court reasoned that the "group pub-
lication" doctrine roped in all officers and directors alleged to "be in day-to-day control of 
the company's management or finances." Id. at 97,766. Although those involved in research 
might have known of the adverse reactions to the drug, absent discovery it seems less likely 
that the CFO and Controller knew and even less likely that they actively participated in 
drafting the press releases or other statements about the prospects for FDA approval for non-
prescription use. 
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between those officers who had such a role and those who did not. All 
officers, simply by going to work, participate in the daily affairs of their 
companies. 
District courts in the Ninth Circuit have veered in differing directions 
as they have applied "group pleading" to officers. Some decisions rely on 
a "functional relationship" between the officer's position and the nature 
of the alleged fraud. 39 Although this test narrows the circle of defendants 
somewhat, it does not focus on the purpose of the "group publication" 
protocol-to permit plaintiffs to name as defendants those who presum-
ably drqjled the misrepresentations. A vice president in charge of European 
sales would presumably make periodic reports to his superiors in a cor-
poration and thus would have some "functional relationship" with any 
39. E.g., Smith v. Network Equip. Tech., Inc., [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 95,659 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1990). In dismissing certain officers, the court 
found the plaintiffs' use of "group" allegations overbroad: 
Plain tiffs have used group pleading indiscriminately to reach every officer of [the issuer]. 
In essence, Plaintiffs argue that Wool allows group pleading against anyone denominated 
an officer without regard to the nature of the fraud alleged by Plaintiffs, or the functional 
connection between the activities of an individual defendant and the activities involved 
in the fraud .... [I] n the present case, Plaintiffs allege a fraudulent scheme involving 
marketing, accounting practices, and fraudulent releases of information. Plaintiffs do 
not allege any improper conduct involving the design or manufacture of [the issuer's] 
products .... [I1here is insufficient evidence to bring the following individual defen-
dants within the Wtiol group: ... Vice President and Chief Technical Officer; ... Vice 
President of Operations; and ... Vice President of Corporate Development. Defendants 
argue, and Plaintiffs do not dispute, that these three individuals are involved in the 
design and manufacture of [the issuer's] products. Thus, they are not connected with 
the scheme alleged by the Plaintiffs, and cannot be properly included in the 'group' 
covered by group pleading under Wool. 
Id. at 98,093-94. See also Molinari v. Symantec Corp., No. C-97-2002 l:JW, 1998 WL 78120, 
at * 11 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1 7, 1998) ("In a company as large as Symantec, the status of officer 
or director is not enough in itself to establish involvement in the group 'functionally related' 
to the alleged fraud."); Strassman, 1995 WL 743728, at *14-*15 ("Plaintiffs assert that the 
group pleading doctrine also applies to insiders Wells and Sherwin [respectively the corporate 
secretary and vice president of human resources] by virtue of the fact that both are Fresh 
Choice officers who had access to internal corporate documents. The fact that an individual 
defendant is an officer of the corporation, even if he or she is involved in the day-to-day 
management of the company, is not enough to invoke the group pleading doctrine. Instead, 
the officer must have some functional relationship with the alleged fraudulent activity .... 
Nothing in the [amended complaint] suggests that Wells had any functional relationship with 
any of the alleged misrepresentations .... As for Sherwin, he is alleged to be vice-president 
of human resources. As such, Plaintiffs assert that Sherwin was acutely aware of Fresh 
Choice's lack of management personnel to control and support the Company's growth which 
Plaintiffs claim forms the basis of several misstatements. However, ... all allegations con-
cerning misrepresentations centering on Fresh Choice's lack of management have been dis-
missed with prejudice. Therefore, since there are no alleged misrepresentations remaining 
involving Sherwin as vice-president of human resources, the group pleading doctrine may 
not be invoked against him.") (citing Smith, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 95,659) (citations omitted). 
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fraud concerning sales in Europe. It is not "presumably" true, however, 
that that vice president would have any role in the characterization of 
European results included in an annual report or a press release with 
quarterly financials. The vice president might be consulted, and arguably 
should be consulted. On the other hand, it could just as easily be argued 
that sales executives, who tend to be optimistic as a breed, have no nec-
essary role in preparing Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) fil-
ings, annual reports, and press releases. Whatever the proper practice 
should be, the probability that the vice president will draft or even review 
the portion of the report or release describing European operations is not 
so high that the vice president should be presumed to have authored any 
mischaracterization of European sales and so automatically be included 
as a defendant in a securities lawsuit based on such a misstatement. 
Aside from employing the "functional relationship" test, some Ninth 
Circuit district courts have expanded or contracted the officers included 
within the "group" based on the size of the issuer and the geographic 
dispersion of its operations.40 These opinions, however, place too much 
faith in the ability of a district judge, at the outset of a case and without 
the benefit of any discovery, to determine how a corporation works. For 
example, when a corporation is small and geographically concentrated, it 
may well be that all officers participate in the preparation of all significant 
public announcements. It is also possible, however, that the different offi-
cers in a developing company have very different strengths and may not 
even possess the qualifications normally associated with the formal posi-
tions they hold. They may delegate public disclosures to one or more of 
their number whose talents appear suitable to that task, regardless of title. 
40. The court in Smith, (1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 95,959, 
emphasized that "[i] n large corporations, with far-flung offices and divisions, the status of 
officer or director is not enough in itself to insure involvement in the group functionally 
related to the fraud." Id. at 98,093-94. See also In re USA Talks.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., Master 
File No. 99-CV-O 162-L(JA), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14823, at* 11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2000) 
("Because the individual defendants are inside, controlling persons ofUSAT, a small company 
with only four full-time employees, and allegedly acted together with regard to other disclo-
sures, the [complaint] need not draw a specific connection between every alleged misrepre-
sentation and a particular defendant."); In re Aldus Sec. Litig., (1992-1993 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)~ 97,376, at 95,988 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 1993) (dismissing defendant 
"because during the Class Period he presided over an Aldus subsidiary in Scotland, and thus 
could not have been connected with the alleged misrepresentations"); In re Epitope, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 97,263, at 95,188 (D. Or. 
Nov. 30, 1992) (refusing to exclude three vice presidents in part by distinguishing the company 
from Network Equipment: "Epitope is not a 'large corporation with far-flung offices and 
divisions,' but rather a local company which bases a substantial portion of its operations and 
future income on a single product ... . ");In re U.S. Bioscience Sec. Litig., 806 F. Supp. 1197, 
1203-04 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (relying primarily on Ninth Circuit cases to deny dismissal "because 
Bioscience is a relatively small start-up company with only forty people in the entire enter-
prise, each officer and director can be expected to bear more responsibility and have greater 
knowledge of the venture than an officer ... in a large, well-established corporation"). 
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Small companies may also lack corporate routines to ensure the circulation 
of draft public disclosures to all appropriate officers before publication. 
Indeed, such companies may be dominated by a single strong individual 
who does not involve others in important announcements. An assumption 
that all officers in smaller, geographically concentrated companies are 
within some "group" preparing all corporate disclosures ignores all these 
circumstances. 
The best-reasoned lower court decisions require plaintiffs to plead facts 
showing that all officers named in the "group" were "directly" involved 
in creating or communicating the allegedly misleading publication.41 This 
is the very test suggested by U0ol-that the "group" should be "narrowly 
defined" and should have "direct" involvement in the challenged docu-
ment. 42 It is also the test that focuses on the purpose of the presumption. 
That test yields an important corollary: an officer can only be a member 
of a "group" when he or she is at the company. The pleading exception 
should not apply to officers who left a company before a statement was 
"group published" or who joined the company after that publication.43 
41. E.g., In re Oak Tech. Sec. Litig., No. 96-20552 SW, 1997 WL 448168, at *I I (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. I, 1997) ("To establish the liability of the vice president Defendants under the 
group pleading exception, Plaintiffs must satisfy a necess<1rily stricter requirement. Since all 
of the inside officers in a corporation, by virtue of their positions, are involved in daily 
corporate activities, merely pleading as much is not sufficient to establish their liability under 
the group pleading exception. To establish the liability of these Defendants for Oak's allegedly 
misleading statements, Plaintiffs must plead that these vice presidents were directly involved 
'not only in the day-to-day affairs of [Oak] in general but also in [the preparation of its] 
financial statements in particular.' The existing Complaint does not allege that these Defen-
dants participated in the preparation or communication of allegedly misleading information. 
Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to establish the liability of the vice president Defendants under 
the group pleading exception.") (quoting Wool, 818 F.2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987)). The 
court in In re Splash Technology Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C99-00 I 09 SBA, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15369, at *82 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2000), recently followed Oak. See also Copperstone 
v. TCSI Corp., No. C 97-3495 SBA, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20978, at *54 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 19, 
1999) (granting motion to dismiss because, "[CJ or corporate insiders, a plaintiff must plead that 
the Defendants were involved in the preparation of the allegedly misleading statements" in 
order to invoke group pleading, and the complaint did not allege any facts showing that "the 
inside directors were directly involved in the preparation of" the challenged representations). 
42. See Wool, 818 E2d at 1440. 
43. In Berry v. Valence Technology, Inc., 175 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 528 U.S. 1019 
(1999), the court affirmed dismissal of the former CEO: 
Dawson resigned as Valence's CEO on April 30, 1993. The district court held that since 
Plaintiffs failed to specify the nature of Dawson's operational involvement in Valence 
after that date, they were not entitled to the 'group published information' presumption. 
Plaintiffs did allege in their Third Amended Complaint that Dawson remained Chair-
man of the Board until October 30, 1993. They also alleged that Dawson retained 
significant holdings in Valence after his resignation as CEO, and that he sold more than 
$30 million in stock in the months following. Plaintiffs did not, however, allege that 
Dawson had any operational involvement in Valence's day-to-day corporate activities. 
In fact, the Third Amended Complaint contains no allegations of how Dawson con-
trolled or otherwise significantly influenced the alleged misstatements made by Valence 
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WHAT CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS ARE "GROUP 
PUBLISHED"? 
If the first task in applying Wool was identifying the individuals within 
the "group" doing the publishing, the second was identifying what that 
"group" "published." Wool itself referred to "prospectuses, registration 
statements, annual reports [and] press releases" but also referenced un-
specified "other 'group-published information.' "44 One decision held that 
"Wool's relaxed pleading rule applies ... only to publicly-held compa-
nies."45 Other opinions apply the pleading protocol to a Confidential In-
formation Memorandum, Offering Memorandum, and Merger Agree-
ment in what appears to be a private stock sale;46 and even to offer sheets 
given to retiring employees as part of an effort to repurchase their stock.47 
District courts in the Ninth Circuit have limited the protocol, how-
ever, by determining that many communications are not "group pub-
lished." They have not extended Wool to oral statements.48 They do 
not apply the presumption to analysts' reports,49 articles in the financial 
after his resignation. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the claims against Daw-
son to the extent they are based on alleged misstatements made after his resignation. 
Id. at 706-07 (footnote omitted). See also In re PETsMART, Inc. Sec. Litig., 61 F. Supp. 2d 
982, 998 (D. Ariz. 1999) (asking rhetorically: "Do plaintiffs mean to suggest ... that Hansen 
had the opportunity and was motivated to inflate the price of stock for a convertible note 
offering which occurred five months after his departure? Or that Schnabel should be held 
responsible for optimistic statements made during 1996 even though she didn't arrive until 
February of 1997? ... [Plaintiffs] cannot combine the group pleading doctrine with an 
allegation of a fraudulent scheme to avoid pleading critical details."); Aldus, [1992-1993 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,988 ("[D]efendants argue that all post-
termination 1 Ob-5 claims against [three former officers] must be dismissed as group pleading 
cannot extend past the dates they left Aldus. Plaintiffs ... do not respond to this contention, 
and on this basis, all post-termination claims against [those three] are hereby DISMISSED."). 
44. 818 F.2d at 1440. 
45. Wanetick v. Mel's of Modesto, Inc., 811F.Supp.1402, 1405-06 n.l (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
46. See J.F. Lehman & Co., Inc. v. Treinen, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) '\191,046, at 94,869 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2000). 
47. See Walsh v. Emerson, Nos. 88-952-DA, 88-1367-DA, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18289, 
at *9 (D. Or. Oct. 2, 1989) (comment made in context of evaluating ERISA claim). 
48. See XOMA Corp. Sec. Litig., [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
'\196,491, at 92,161 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 1991) ("[B]y its very nature the group pleading 
presumption does not apply to oral statements by individual defendants-only to group published 
information."). See also Krieger v. Gast, No. 4:99-CV-86, 2000 WL 288442, at *9 (W.D. 
Mich. Jan. 21, 2000) (" [B] ecause the presumption applies only to written documents, it 
encompasses statements or omissions in the Notice [of a shareholders meeting] but does not 
apply to the oral statements which Krieger alleges Warren Gast made at the shareholders 
meeting."); Schlagel v. Learning Tree Int'!., [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
'IJ 90,403, at 91,815 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1998) ("The Court agrees that even before the 
PSLRA, the group publication doctrine could not be applied to oral statements. The PSLRA 
has only strengthened the requirement that allegations of oral misrepresentations be attrib-
uted to specific individuals rather than lumping defendants together.") (citations omitted); In 
re Interactive Network, Inc. Sec. Litig., 948 F. Supp. 91 7, 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("[I] he group 
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publication doctrine cannot apply to oral statements. This is clearly true."); In re Picard Chem. 
Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo Co., 940 F. Supp. 1101, 1128 (WD. Mich. 1996) ("[T)he 
group pleading presumption does not apply to oral statements made by individual defen-
dants."); In re Gupta Corp. Sec. Litig., 900 F. Supp. 1217, 1240 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("[O]ral 
statements attributable to individual defendants are actionable, if at all, against only those 
defendants."); Hi/fn, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C-99-4531 SI, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11631, at 
*36 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2000); Copperstone v. TCSI Corp., No. C97-3495 SBA, 1999 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 20978, at *53 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 19, 1999); Pleasant Overseas Corp. v. Hajjar, No. 
C93-20197 RMW (EAi), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20981, at *20-*21 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 
1992). 
Some decisions, however, have included oral statements within the "group pleading" pre-
sumption. For example, in LB Partners, L.P. v. Neutrogena Corp., (1995-1996 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 98,913 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 1995), the plaintiffs alleged that the 
CFO's statement that the company knew of no reason for the rise in stock price was false 
because the company was in negotiation for purchase by a larger company at an above-
market price. The plaintiffs also alleged that the Vice President/Treasurer/Secretary delib-
erately directed inquiries to the CFO and that he and the CEO/Chairman "arranged for 
and authorized" the CFO to make his statement. Id. at 93,404. The court held that although 
in this case the CFO "made an oral statement, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that this 
was 'other "group published information'" under Wool." Id. at 93,405. See also Rolex Em-
ployees Retirement Trust v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 749 F. Supp. l 042, 1044 (D. Or. 1990) 
(denying motions to dismiss I O(b) claim against five officers where some of the challenged 
statements were oral-e.g., "Some people have us at $1.50 (a share for 1990), and we think 
that's aggressive in terms of the economy. Some have us at $1.10, which is rather conservative . 
. . . The $1.25-to-$ l .30 range, I think that's the range we would feel more comfortable with.") 
(omission in original). Others suggest that, with the right pleading, oral statements could fall 
within IM!ol. For example, in In re RasterOps Corp. Sec. Liu'g., (1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,231 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 1994), the court stated, "it is not reasonable 
to presume that oral statements by individual defendants are the product of ... collective 
efforts." Id. at 99,603. Here, the plaintiffs provided no facts to indicate that statements made 
at a technology conference attended by securities analysts and the press, or statements that 
an identified defendant made in announcing the promotion of a Vice President, were "the 
collective actions of the officers rather than the statement of an individual defendant." Id. 
"Absent such facts," the court held, "plaintiffs may not invoke the group pleading doctrine 
with respect to these oral statements." Id. 
49. See In re Network Equip. Tech., Inc. Litig., 762 F. Supp. 1359, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1991) 
("[I]ndependently published statements by financial analysts are not 'group published infor-
mation.'"). See also RasterOps Corp., (1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 
99,603 (same); In re Ross Sys. Sec. Litig., (1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 98,363, at 90,499 (N.D. Cal.July 21, 1994) ("[P]laintiffmay not use group pleading 
to attribute third party financial analyst reports to individual defendants because such reports 
are not 'group published information.'"); Fisher v. Acuson Corp., No. C93-20477RMW 
(EAi), 1995 WL 261439, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 1995) (same); Leonard v. NetFRAME 
Sys., Inc., (1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,982, at 93,781 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 8, 1995) (same); Pleasant Overseas Corp., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20981, at *20; 
Coppers/one, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20978, at *53. At least some cases, however, hold out the 
possibility that analyst reports might be attributed to the corporate "group" if the analyst 
reports themselves were based on corporate "group" publications. For example, in Gupta 
Corp., 900 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Cal. 1994), the court denied a motion to dismiss "group 
pleading" claims founded on analysts reports which were allegedly based on the company's 
published third and fourth quarter results. See id. at 1241. The court stated: 
In cases where the analyst reports are actionable against the defendant corporation, the 
central inquiry for determining whether the reports are also actionable as group pub-
Don't Call Me a Securities Law Groupie 1009 
press,s0 or transaction documents, such as leases.51 Documents specifically 
attributed to individuals are also outside the protocol.52 This is appropriate 
because MtOol creates a pleading "presumption." Although it is possible 
that a CEO/President would seek review and comment from others on his 
message to shareholders in an annual report, it is far from certain that he 
or she would do so. The top executive may see the message as a personal 
statement-his one chance to tell all shareholders his view of the company's 
performance and his plans and vision for the future. Courts should not pre-
sume that such messages are a joint product of the executive cadre.53 
lished information is whether the source of the reports' information is group published 
information. Thus, analysts' reports based on financial statements and press releases 
which are actionable against the defendant corporation are also actionable as group 
published information. By contrast, analyst reports which are based on oral statements 
by identified individuals are not actionable as group published information, because the 
underlying oral statements are not group published information. 
Id. at 1240. Also, in Flecker v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) 'I) 99,436 (D. Or. Feb. 12, 1997), the court denied a motion for summary 
judgment because plaintiffs came forward "with evidence tending to show that the analysts' 
statements could fall within the group published exception to the preclusion of liability for 
third party forecasts." Id. at 96,860. 
50. See Steiner v. Hale, 868 F. Supp. 284, 288 (S.D. Cal. 1994) ("[T]he court also rejects 
the plaintiff's request to extend the group publishing doctrine to the publication of newspaper, 
journal, and magazine articles .... The court finds the doctrine does not apply to newspaper 
or journal articles prepared by individuals not associated with the corporation. The defen-
dants have no control over the reporters or what is ultimately contained within the article. 
Thus, the reasoning behind the doctrine, as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, is not applicable 
to this situation."). As with analysts' reports, however, there is some authority for applying 
the presumption if the article is itself based on corporate group information. See In re Keegan 
Management Co. Sec. Litig., [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I! 96,275, at 
91,483 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 1991) ("The only allegations which do not refer to group pub-
lished information are those which relate the comments of market analysts in a financial 
newsletter and a business magazine. However, since these comments are actionable only to 
the extent that they are based on group published information, the presumption also applies 
to them.") (citation omitted). 
51. See Benedict v. Cooperstock, 23 F. Supp. 2d 754, 762-63 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (relying 
primarily on Ninth Circuit cases to find that the "group pleading" doctrine did not apply to 
promissory notes, equipment leases, and service agreements delivered to individual plaintiffs 
as part of an alleged Ponzi scheme). 
52. See Pegasus Holdings v. Veterinary Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1165 (G.D. 
Cal. 1998) ("[W]ritten or oral statements made by an identified defendant cannot be classified 
as 'group published' information."). See also Molinari v. Symantec Corp., No. C-97-20021-
]W; 1998 WL 78120, at * 10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 1998) (stating, without limitation to oral 
presentations, that "[s]tatements made by an identified individual are not group published 
materials."). 
53. But see In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) 'I! 99,325, at 95,965 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996) (applying "group pleading" 
to a report to shareholders including a letter signed by the Chairman of the Board/CEO 
which contained allegedly misleading statements about shipment of a product). 
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Because some forms of corporate communication are not subject to 
"group pleading," plaintiffs must identify the form of a statement before 
they can take advantage of that protocol.54 Even if plaintiffs adequately 
allege the substance of a communication, Wool cannot apply unless plain-
tiffs specifically plead the form and that form is among those which are 
"group published." 
THE SECOND CIRCUIT VERSION: A TRIO OF 
PARTNERSHIP CASES SETTING OUT PRINCIPLES ALSO 
APPLICABLE TO CORPORATIONS 
The Second Circuit developed its "group pleading" protocol in the 
context of limited partnership transactions, where organizers and pro-
moters frequently create a welter of partnerships and corporations to con-
duct a business. There are three principal cases. 
Luce v. Edelstein55 was the first. The twenty plaintiffs had invested in a 
limited partnership which was to renovate buildings in New York City and 
convert them into condominium units for artists and art-related businesses. 
The thirteen defendants included the limited partnership itself, as well as 
two corporate general partners, four other corporations and a partnership 
which were affiliates of and allegedly controlled the corporate general part-
ners (who were the affiliates' alleged alter egos), and five individuals who 
54. See Autodesk, Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '\191,260, at 
95,429 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2000) ("Nor do plaintiffs specify which of the allegedly misleading 
statements provide the basis for the application of the 'group published information' doctrine. 
The ... doctrine applies to written documents originating with the company, such as press 
releases, prospectuses, and SEC filings. By definition, it does not apply to third-party reports, 
such as reports issued by analyst~, transcripts of interviews with company officers or directors, 
or reports of oral representations made by officers or directors."); In re Sunrise Tech. Sec. 
Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '\197,042, at 94,585 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
22, 1992) ("By its very nature the group pleading presumption does not apply to oral state-
ments by individual defendants. Therefore, plaintiffs must allege facts that establish that the 
allegedly misleading statements were, in fact, 'group published' .... [P]laintiffs' allegations 
consist almost entirely of statements that 'Sunrise announced' .... Plaintiffs never allege 
where the alleged misrepresentations appeared-i.e., were these 'announcements' made in a 
press release or some other presumptively group-published forum, or were they made in 
private conversation? ... Absent such allegations ... plaintiffs cannot employ the group 
pleading presumption."). See also Smith v. Network Equip. Tech., Inc., [1990-1991 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '\195,659, at 98,093 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1990) ("Paragraphs 
34, 40-42, and 46 of the Amended Complaint allege unattributed misrepresentations which 
were communicated in unidentified forms to financial analysts and the press. These allega-
tions fail to allege specifically either particular misrepresentations by identified defendants, or 
particular misrepresentations published through identified forms of group published infor-
mation. Thus, these allegations arc inadequate and are stricken from the complaint with 
leave to amend."). 
55. 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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were "past or present directors and officers" of the two corporate general 
partners. 56 
The district court denied a motion for a preliminary injunction, dis-
missed portions of the complaint on the basis of a forum selection clause, 
and dismissed other allegations for failure to plead fraud with sufficient 
particularity.57 The Second Circuit affirmed denial of the preliminary in-
junction and enforcement of the forum selection clause but reversed in 
part the Rule 9(b) dismissal and remanded to permit plaintiffs to amend.58 
The court found that some of the alleged misrepresentations in the Offer-
ing Memorandum passed 9(b) muster: allegations that the general partners 
represented they would make capital contributions of$385,000 when they 
actually contributed approximately $80,000, and allegations that the cost 
of renovating the buildings would be $4,500,000 when liabilities for the 
still incomplete project already exceeded $10,200,000. 59 
In the course of the opinion, the Second Circuit spoke directly to the 
specificity with which the complaint had to tie each defendant to the fraud, 
noting that, "no specific connection between fraudulent representations in 
the Offering Memorandum and particular defendants is necessary where, 
as here, defendants are insiders or affiliates participating in the offer of the 
securities in question."60 
This formula was broad and threatened to sweep into limited partner-
ship cases virtually any company or individual who had anything to do 
with the proposed business at the time the limited partners bought their 
interests. The Second Circuit's second case recognized this problem and 
circumscribed the pleading rule. 
In Di Vittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Industries, Inc.,61 plaintiffs had purchased 
interests in a limited partnership formed to obtain and exploit coal prop-
erties and oil leases. They sued everyone in sight: (i) the limited partnership 
itself; (ii) the corporate general partner and its parent; (iii) two affiliated 
corporations that were, respectively, a contract driller and a contract 
miner; (iv) an affiliated corporation that sublet properties to the partner-
ship; (v) a subsidiary of the corporate parent of the general partner that 
served as the manager and syndicator of the parent's real estate interests 
(the manager I syndicator); (vi) the current vice president of the corporate 
general partner; (vii) a former vice president of the corporate general part-
ner; (viii) a director of the corporate parent of the general partner and 
director of the manager/syndicator who was a past or present officer of 
the general partner's parent and the manager/syndicator; (ix) a controlling 
shareholder and president of the general partner's parent who was also 
56. Id. at 52. 
57. Id. at 51. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 55. 
60. Id. 
61. 822 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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president of the general partner, and the secretary-treasurer and a director 
of the manager/syndicator; (x) a law firm; (xi) an accounting firm and one 
of its partners; and (xii) a contract driller that was not owned directly or 
indirectly by the corporate general partner or its parent. The district court 
dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 9(b).62 
The Second Circuit reversed as to the limited partnership, the corpo-
ration that was the general partner, and the corporate parent of that gen-
eral partner. 63 The court of appeals affirmed, however, as to all other 
defendants: 
The amended complaint identifies Eastern only as an "affiliate of the 
General Partner, and the Contract Miner for the Partnership's coal 
properties"; EDC as "an affiliate of the General Partner, and the co-
contracting driller ... for the development of the Partnership's oil 
properties"; Eastland as "an affiliate of the General Partner, which 
... sublet coal properties to the Partnership"; and Properties as "a 
subsidiary of Equidyne ... [which] serves as a manager and syndi-
cator of Equidyne real estate investments". These allegations are in-
adequate to charge these defendants with liability for misrepresen-
tations in the Offering Memorandum. 
None of the individual Equidyne defendants, Ross, Beeler, Rock 
and Liebmann, is tied to the Offering Memorandum in any specific 
way, or even alleged to have been an officer or director of any non-
individual Equidyne defendant when the Offering Memorandum was 
issued or the specified class of plaintiffs bought their limited partner-
ship interests.6+ 
As to the law firm defendant, the accountant defendants, and the drilling 
company that was not owned by the partnership's organizer, the court 
found no allegations "sufficient to describe any of them as insiders or 
affiliates," or "linking any of them in any specific way to any fraudulent 
misrepresentation or omission,'' and therefore affirmed their dismissal.65 
Ouaknine v. MacFarlane 66 completes the trio of principal Second Circuit 
cases. In Ouaknine, plaintiff bought stock in a company that put the money 
into a partnership between that company and MacFarlane Perry Com-
pany. MacFarlane Development Company was a contractor for the un-
derlying business project-renovation and sale of cooperative apartments 
in New York City. Plaintiff alleged misrepresentations in the offering mem-
orandum for the stock and the limited partnership agreement, which plain-
tiff saw before buying the stock. Plaintiff sued the partnership, MacFarlane 
62. Id. at 1244. 
63. Id. at I 249. 
64. Id. at 1248-49 (citations omitted). 
65. Id. at 1249. 
66. 897 F.2d 7 5 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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Perry, Macfarlane Development, and two individuals: Robert Mac-
Farlane, who appeared to be the organizer of the venture, and an account-
ant who worked for Macfarlane and who allegedly induced plaintiff to 
agree to the sale of stock in yet another corporation. The district court 
dismissed. 
The Second Circuit reversed in part, holding that all of the defendants 
were properly named on the securities claim, except MacFarlane Devel-
opment.67 The court characterized DiVittorio as holding that "allegations 
merely that [a] defendant is an affiliate and contracted to perform work 
are insufficient to link [the] affiliate with representations in [an] offering 
memorandum. "68 
Luce and Di Vittorio were limited partnership cases. Although the plaintiff 
in Ouaknine had purchased stock, the proceeds of his investment were then 
transferred to a partnership. It was clear, nevertheless, that the Second 
Circuit would apply this trio of"group pleading" decisions to corporations. 
In making its "group pleading" holding, Luce cited to two district court 
cases, 69 both of which involved alleged corporate wrongdoing: Somerville v. 
Major Exploration, Inc., 70 denying a motion to dismiss and holding that "for 
the most part, plaintiffs allegations with respect to these defendants involve 
misstatements or omissions in documents-annual reports, financial state-
ments-that may be presumed to entail the collective actions of the direc-
tors, officers, and the accountant, in some cases";7 1 and Pellman v. Cinerama, 
Inc., 72 denying a motion to dismiss on facts involving an allegedly false 
proxy statement and observing that the "defendants here are all insiders 
... and numerous courts have held that the conduct of such individuals 
need not be specified if the complaint sufficiently describes the fraudulent 
acts and provides the individuals with sufficient information to answer. " 73 
Moreover, although not part of the trio discussed above, Cosmas v. Has-
sett74 confronted exclusively corporate facts and seemed to apply "group 
pleading" in that setting. Cosmas vacated dismissal of a lawsuit against eight 
directors brought by a securities purchaser alleging misleading statements 
by one officer I director in a magazine article and misleading statements in 
an annual report, a 10-K, and press releases. One defendant "signed the 
1985 Annual Report and the 1985 1 OK, and, according to the amended 
complaint, the other defendants read these documents before they were 
issued."75 The court found that the complaint "adequately identifies the 
67. Id. at 84. 
68. Id. at 80. 
69. Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1986). 
70. 576 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y 1983). 
71. Id. at 911. 
72. 503 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y 1980). 
73. Id. at 111. 
74. 886 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1989). 
75. Id. at IO. 
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defendants as those responsible for the statements."76 Oddly, although de-
cided after both Luce and DiVittorio, Cosmas cites to neither.77 
ELABORATION OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT RULE 
The Second Circuit "group pleading" protocol raised the same two 
questions as the Ninth Circuit protocol: (i) to which defendants did the 
"group pleading" exception apply (in this case, what entities and individ-
uals were included within Luce's "insiders and affiliates"); and (ii) to what 
communications did the exception apply. Because the Second Circuit's 
cases include so many cases decided in the limited partnership context, 
this Article will address these questions first there and then in the corporate 
setting. 
TO WHAT DEFENDANTS DOES THE LUCE EXCEPTION 
APPLY IN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP CASES? 
In the limited partnership context, the Luce exception to the general rule 
that a complaint must connect specific misstatements with particular de-
fendants waives that pleading requirement for the "individuals who or-
ganized, promoted and/ or managed the ... partnerships and the affiliated 
corporations controlled by these individuals. " 78 The "insider or affiliated" 
entity defendants typically include the general partners, managing com-
panies, and corporations or partnerships actually involved in the sale of 
the limited partnership interests. 79 
76. Id. at 12 (citation omitted). 
77. Only a few cases cite Cosmas as "group pleading" authority. See, e.g., Benedict v. Amad-
ucci, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,830, at 93,010 (S.D.N.Y 
July II, 1995). 
78. Hayden v. Feldman, 753 F. Supp. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y 1990) (citation omitted). See also 
Parnes v. Mast Property Investors, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 792, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that 
Luce applied to individual defendants who were officers of the corporate promoter of the 
limited partnerships in a case where plaintiff alleged that defendants participated in or di-
rected the writing and distribution of the offering memoranda). 
79. The definition is elastic. See ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay Int'! Corp., 
[1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 99,345, at 96, JOO (S.D.N.Y.Jan. 23, 
1996). The court applied the Luce exception to MERMCI which was a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of MIC, and a general partner in the limited partnership in which plaintiffESI bought 
an interest. MIC retained a 28% interest in the partnership through its related entities. MMT 
was a common law trust created for the benefit of MIC and its affiliated companies, and was 
also a limited partner. The court found that the Luce exception applied to MERMCI, holding: 
MERMCI is an indirect subsidiary of defendant MIC and therefore is an affiliate of 
MIC. MIC agreed with defendant MMT that MMT would sell a portion of MMT's 
interest in the partnership to ESI. Thus, MERMCI is an affiliate in the sale offer for 
an interest in the Partnership. Moreover, while the DiVittorio court found that the Luce 
rule did not help the complaint overcome its defective particularity because the 
complaint solely identified the parties at issue as affiliates, ESI has described that: 
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Some limitations to the group of "insiders and affiliates" are well estab-
lished. Lawyers and accountants who perform traditional, professional 
roles in preparing offering documents are not within the group.BO Nor are 
(1) MERMCI contributed its assets to the Partnership; (2) MERMCI became and re-
mained a general partner in the Partnership; and, (3) that plaintiff, MERMCI, MMIC 
and MMGP executed an agreement specifying their respective partnership interests. 
Thus, the complaint sufficiently alleges MERMCI to be an affiliate. 
Id. at 96,100 (citations omitted). See also Boley v. Pineloch Assocs., Ltd., [1990 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) if 95,407, at 97,001 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 2, 1990) (pleading 
exception applicable to CCL-Associates and CCL-Cornerstone, "[p]laintiffs allege that CCL-
Associates, and by implication its general partner, CCL-Cornerstone, participated as insiders 
in the fraudulent preparation of the Memorandum .... Plaintiffs refer to the facts that CCL-
Associates is the administrative general partner of Pineloch and received fees in connection 
with its organization, and that typically an administrative general partner is responsible for 
the preparation of placement memoranda and circulation to underwriters. They also refer 
to Moran's report [Moran was a general partner who had provided an affidavit to the 
Bankruptcy Court] of involvement by 'Cornerstone ... ' in the preparation and review of 
the Memorandum."). 
80. See DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1249 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(finding attorney and accountant defendants outside the Luce group). Also, in Morin v. Trupin, 
809 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y 1993), the court found that 
[a]lthough partners and principals in partnerships are insiders, and affiliates, controlling 
stockholders, officers and directors of partnerships are insiders ... [ o] utside attorneys 
and accountants will not be considered controlling persons unless they have influence 
over the day-to-day operations of the offering entity. Here, in contrast to earlier plead-
ings, the Plaintiffs allege that the professional defendants are insiders, who knowingly 
and consciously participated in the scheme to defraud. The Plaintiffs must therefore 
allege some form of immediate control over operations, or else plead sufficient connec-
tions between these defendants and the certain allegedly misleading statements which 
can be ascribed specifically to them to meet the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b). 
Id. at 1087 (citation omitted). The court then granted leave to file an amended complaint 
against attorneys and accountants because plaintiffs had alleged their connection to specific 
misrepresentations. Id. at 1090. In Morin v. Trupin, 778 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y 1991 ), the 
plaintiffs alleged that an attorney (Abrams), who was the in-house counsel for the entities 
involved in the syndication, "participated" in drafting certain sections of the Private Place-
ment Memorandum and "supervis[ed] and direct[ed]" an outside law firm in connection 
with the offering materials, but did not allege that any false statements appeared in the 
sections that Abrams drafted himself. Id. at 718. The court held that the attorney was not 
an insider and that the complaint did "not adequately plead a connection between Abrams 
and [the allegedly misleading] statements." Id. In another case, Stevens v. Equidyne Extractive 
Indus. 1980, 694 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y 1988), the court found that, "[s]ince [counsel] in 
drafting the offering memorandum was acting not on its own behalf but on that of the 
Equidyne defendants, it is not a corporate insider and therefore the relaxed standards of 
pleading with respect to who said what do not apply." Id. at 1062. The court also held the 
accounting firm was "not an insider but in effect an independent contractor" and therefore 
"cannot be held for general statements in the Offering Memorandum not specifically attrib-
uted to it." Id. at 1063. Continuing, the court found accountants were answerable for rep-
resentations of tax benefits in Pro Forma Financial Illustrations that they prepared, but the 
illustrations were accompanied with sufficient cautionary language that the accountants were 
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independent brokerage firms that market partnership interests,8 1 compa-
nies that provide contract service to a partnership's business,82 or consul-
tants to a partnership.83 Some decisions also import the "day-to-day" in-
dismissed. Id. at 1064. See also Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries Ltd. Partnership, 730 F. 
Supp. 521, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), eff'd, 927 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 199 l) (unpublished table decision) 
(noting authority "for the proposition that where counsel drafted the offering memorandum 
and were acting on behalf of the general partner, they are not, without more, corporate 
insiders or affiliates to whom the relaxed pleadings standards are applicable .... [T]hey are 
not ordinarily liable for the general statements in the offering memorandum but rather 
plaintiffs must specifically attribute misstatements or omissions to them.") (citation omitted); 
Klein v. Churchill Coal Corp., Nos. 84CfV.6509 (WK), 1988 WL 92114, at *IO (S.D.N.Y. 
May 5, 1988) ("In a securities fraud suit arising out of the sale oflimited partnerships, 'insider' 
status generally extends to the general partner and to affiliates involved in preparation of the 
offering memoranda, but not, in the absence of special circumstances, to the law and ac-
counting firms who assist in such preparations."). 
81. See Pahmer v. Greenberg, 926 F. Supp. 287, 308 ("Because (the broker/ dealer defen-
dant] was not an insider and because the complaint does not allege any specific facts indi-
cating that [the defendant] attained insider status, the claims against it for securities fraud 
arc not subject to relaxed Ruic 9(b) pleading standards."), alf'd sub nom, Shapiro v. Cantor, 
123 F.3d 717 (2d Cir. 1997); Eickhorst v. American Completion and Dev. Corp., 706 F. Supp. 
1087, 1092-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (dismissing national brokerage firm acting as selling agent for 
limited partnership interests and holding, "(m]ere conclusory allegations of insider status ... 
without accompanying facts which tie a defendant to the offering materials in a specific way, 
will not suffice to obviate the need to specify each defendant's connection with the alleged 
fraudulent acts .... There are no allegations that Hutton had any role in preparing the 
prospectus or the brochure describing (the limited partnership]. Moreover, no facts are pre-
sented to support the allegation that Hutton was closely involved with the activities of (the 
limited partnership] or the other defendants, or that Hutton actually stood in the position of 
an insider with relation to the sale of the interests ... Plaintiffs ... allege that a 'close 
association' existed among [two of the individual defendants] and certain unidentified mem-
bers of Hutton's 'top management'. ... Nowhere in the complaint, however, is the factual 
basis set forth for this conclusion. Likewise, plaintiffs offer no source of facts for their assertion 
that these unidentified members of the 'top management' at Hutton 'pushed' the sale of the 
[limited partnership] interests because [the two individual defendants] 'were friends and/or 
close associates of members of Hutton's top management'. ... There arc simply no facts 
presented to warrant an inference that a close relationship or friendship actually existed, or 
to ascertain what individuals might have been involved in such a relationship and if they 
pushed the sale of the [limited partnership] interests. Such conclusory allegations are insuf-
ficient to establish Hutton as an insider."). See also Boley v. Pineloch Assocs., Ltd., 700 F. 
Supp. 673, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("PaineWebber is not an insider or an affiliate; thus, some 
basis for its alleged role must be stated."). 
82. See Di Vittorio, 822 E2d at 1248-49 (finding an affiliated mining company (Eastern), an 
affiliated drilling company (EDC), and an unaffiliated drilling company (Inland) not insiders 
in case where limited partnership sought to exploit coal and oil leases); Chamarac Properties, 
Inc. v. Pike, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)iJ 97,802, at 97,950 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 19, 1993) (holding that plaintiff could not use "group pleading" against a company that 
managed properties beneficially owned by certain partnerships in which plaintiff's limited 
partnership owned interests). 
83. The court in Morin, 809 E Supp. I 081 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), found that an outside adviser 
(Continental) and its president (Organek) were not insiders for purposes of a private place-
ment memorandum. Id. at 1095. The court wrote: 
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volvement concept, or something similar, in order to limit the circle of 
individuals who can fall within the Luce exception. 04 
The line describing the circle of "insiders and affiliates," however, is ill-
defined. The courts have provided no formal definition of these terms. 85 
Moreover, DiVittorio left the status of "affiliates," however they might be 
defined, so unclear that one court wrote: "to be charged with lia-
The Plaintiffs allege that the Offering Materials disclosed that Continental advised the 
Rothschild Group between 1983 and 1987 in connection with approximately 18 real 
estate syndications, including the Sacramento Associates Offering, involving 13 com-
mercial real estate properties. They allege that Organek was more of an insider than 
either the (accountants) or (the attorneys], and that his sole employer was Trupin [the 
man who founded and controlled the Rothschild Group). Organek's duties in the Trupin 
hierarchy, they allege, included locating real estate to be syndicated; acquiring these 
properties for the Rothschild Group; negotiating the acquisitions; structuring the trans-
actions and financing the acquisition of the properties; obtaining loans for the acquisition 
of these properties; financial restructuring when syndication revenues did not generate 
sufficient funds; conducting the Rothschild Group's due diligence investigation preced-
ing the acquisition of the properties; and obtaining and reviewing real estate information 
regarding the syndicated properties for inclusion in the relevant private placement 
memorandum. 
Id. at 1094. The court then stated, "[t]hese allegations of [Continental's and its president's) 
activity to promote the interests of the syndication are still too insufficiently particular to link 
either to the preparation of the PPM or the sale of the partnership interests." Id. The court 
nevertheless permitted plaintiffs to file their amended complaint against Continental and 
Organek based on an alleged misrepresentation of a brokerage fee in the PPM. Id. at I I 00. 
On reconsideration, the court reversed and found that no claim could be made against 
Continental and Organek: 
The Plaintiffs have presented no evidence that Organek actually knew, or culpably 
refused to see, how the fees were being characterized in the Sacramento PPM. Without 
providing more to demonstrate Organek's "insider" status, his inaction will not make 
him liable .... [T]he Plaintiffs do allege that Organek participated in the day-to-day 
operations of Sacramento Associates .... [T]hese general allegations ... are insufficient 
to survive Rule 9(b). 
Morin v. Trupin, 823 F. Supp. 201, 206 (S.D.N.Y 1993). 
84. For example, in Andrews v. Fitzgerald, 823 F. Supp. 356 (M.D.N.C. 1993), the court 
found that the "[p] lain tiffs have sufficiently pied facts of insider status and day-to-day in-
volvement as to the Fitzgerald defendants so that Plaintiffs can take advantage of. . . l#ol 
and Luce." Id. at 374. Securities claims against an officer and director and one-third owner 
of the other corporate general partner-KPWIC-were dismissed, however, because "[u)nlike 
other Defendants who allegedly worked with the managing general partner ... and were 
involved in the Partnership's day-to-day affairs, or, like KPWIC, served as a general partner 
of the Partnership, there is no such 'tie-in' for [this individual defendant)." Id. at 374-75 
(emphasis in original). See also Bruce v. Martin, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 'IJ 96,964, at 94, 118 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 13, 1992) (granting motion to dismiss by director 
and member of two-man Finance Committee of corporate general partner because there 
were no allegations that he participated in the management of the corporate general partner 
or of the limited partnerships). 
85. For example, research finds no decision tying the definition of an "affiliate" under 
Luce to the definition of "affiliate" in the securities regulations. See 17 C.F.R. § 230. l 44(a)( I) 
(2000). 
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bility for misrepresentations, an affiliate must ... be tied to the offering 
memorandum in some, albeit non-specific, way . . . . "86 
TO WHAT COMMUNICATIONS DOES THE LUCE 
EXCEPTION APPLY IN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP CASES? 
The Luce court carved out its pleading exception for "representations in 
the Offering Memorandum. "87 As to other representations, however, Luce 
sustained the argument that the complaint failed to connect particular 
statements to specific defendants: 
[P]aragraph 68 of the complaint alleges: "During the course of the 
project, defendants continually misrepresented to the plaintiffs and 
the class the cost, status and expected completion date of the project." 
Paragraph 84 alleges: "Upon information and belief, defendants made 
oral and written representations to plaintiffs and the class regarding 
their returns on investment and cash and tax benefits apart from the 
Offering Memorandum. These further representations occurred, 
upon information and belief, both before the Closing and thereafter in 
connection with further solicitation oflimited partners." Such allega-
tions, which fail to specify the time, place, speaker, and sometimes even 
the content of the alleged misrepresentations, lack the "particulars" 
required by Rule 9(b).R8 
DiVittorio also dealt with an offering memorandum, although at one point 
it referred to "an offering memorandum or similar document .... "89 The 
Ouaknine plaintiffs alleged misrepresentations in an offering memorandum 
and a related partnership agreement, and the decision appears to apply 
Luce to both.9° In other limited partnership cases, lower courts in the Sec-
ond Circuit have been somewhat reluctant to extend Luce beyond offering 
documents. 91 
86. Morin v. Trupin, 747 F. Supp. 1051, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (emphasis added). The case 
of Adler v. Berg Harmon Assocs., 816 E Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), is an example of how elastic 
the "insiders and affiliates" concept can be. It ruled that two companies were "insiders" 
where one of them was the parent (and the other the parent of the parent) of a company 
which was, in turn, one of two joint venturers in a joint venture that promoted and syndicated 
the limited partnerships. Id. at 928. These companies were sufficiently connected with the 
private placement memoranda by the actions of an individual defendant who was an officer 
of each of the two companies and also president of the joint venture. Id. 
87. Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1986). 
88. Id. at 54 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
89. DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 922 F.2d 1242, 1248 (2d Cir. 1987). 
90. Ouaknine v. Macfarlane, 897 E2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1990). 
91. For example, in Morin, the court found that "to the extent [plaintiffs) concededly rely 
upon nonparticularized oral representations or written statements extrinsic to the offering 
memoranda ... [such as marketing literature and projections and oral sales pitches], plaintiffs 
are obligated under Rule 9(b) to give the specific defendants charged with such communi-
cative acts more specific notice ... [and observe] the obligation to specify the factual basis 
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TO WHAT DEFENDANFS DOES THE LUCE EXCEPTION 
APPLY WHEN A CORPORATION IS THE ISSUER? 
Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit has not addressed in any 
studied way the reach of "group pleading" in cases where plaintiffs bought 
securities issued by corporations. With its principal cases authored in the 
comparatively free-form world oflimited partnership deals, it is small won-
der that district courts applying those precedents to corporations have 
reached differing conclusions, particularly as to which entities and individ-
uals may be embraced within the "insiders and affiliates" that constitute 
the Second Circuit's "group." 
The decisions addressing whether directors are within the "group" il-
lustrate the point. Somerville, Pellman, and Cosmas-all early decisions-seem 
to treat directors the same as officers (as "insiders"), without any effort to 
identify outside directors and analyze separately the wisdom of applying 
the "group" exception to them. 92 Although some later opinions hold that 
for holding a particular defendand responsible for a particular act .... " 747 F. Supp. at 
1061-62. In another case, Dymm v. Cahill, 730 F. Supp. 1245 (S.D.N.Y 1990), the court held 
that the plaintiff did "not allege that the misrepresentations were conveyed through an of-
fering memorandum; in fact, he asserts that '[n]o offering memorandum ... was provided 
... .' Therefore, he must provide each defendant with sufficient notice of that defendant's 
part in the fraud ... .'' Id. at 1250-51 (citation omitted). In Tobias v. First City National Bank 
and Trust Co., 709 F. Supp. 1266 (S.D.N.Y 1989), the court determined that the plaintiff could 
not take advantage of the Luce rule where misrepresentations were "ascribed to either the 
private placement memorandum or oral statements, or both." Id. at 1277. But, see ES/ 
Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay /nt'l Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 99,345 (S.D.N.YJan. 22, 1996), where the court held, "[plaintiff] does not have to 
allege that [defendant deemed to be an 'affiliate' within the meaning of Luce] prepared or 
caused the preparation of the Confidential Investment Memoranda or the Representations 
[outside the Memoranda] provided to [plaintiff] prior to purchase." Id. at 96,101. The 
representations outside the Memoranda were included in schedules of sources and uses and 
in other statements repeated both orally and in writing. The court noted that "the Second 
Circuit in Di Vittorio expressly included 'similar documents' as within the exception applicable 
to an offering memorandum with the caveat that both categories of documents must then 
satisfy certain criteria in order for the exception to be applicable." Id. at 96,100 n.5. 
92. See, e.g., Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1989) (reporting that "the eight 
named defendants were directors of [the issuer]" and later further identifying one of them 
as the CEO); Somerville v. Major Exploration, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 902, 911 (S.D.N.Y 1983) 
(holding that documents such as "annual reports, financial statements ... may be presumed 
to entail the collective actions of the directors, officers and the accountant, in some cases.") 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted); Pellman v. Cinerama, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 107, 108, 111 
(S.D.N.Y 1980) (identifying defendants as "various officers, directors, and controlling share-
holders of Cinerama," and stating that "[t]he defendants here are all insiders .... ") (em-
phasis added). See also Friedman v. Treasure Island N.V., No. 99Civ.2882 (PKL), 1992 WL 
111371, at *6 (S.D.N.Y May 4, 1992) (holding nine directors in without any discussion of 
which were inside and which were outside); Quantum Overseas, N.V. v. Touche Ross & Co., 
663 F. Supp. 658, 667-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding plaintiff qualified for Luce exception by 
pleading that the individual defendants were "officers and/or directors [of the issuer and] 
were able to and did control the content of [the issuer's] public statements [and] SEC filings 
during the class period and of a Prospectus dated September 14, 1984 ... .''). 
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outside directors are not within the Luce circle,93 a number of district courts 
have found circumstances such as serving on a committee or signing a 
document to forfeit "outsider" status even for directors who do not hold 
an office in the corporation.94 There is no clear distinction like the "day-
93. For instance, in Fisk v. Superannuities, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y 1996), the court 
distinguished in dicta "outside directors," among others, from the "insiders" who need not 
be particularly connected to misstatements. Id. at 727-28. In Bank ef f!ermont v. Lyndonville 
Savings Bank & Trust Co., 906 F. Supp. 221 (D. Vt. 1995), the court held that where a complaint 
identified four defendants as "directors and employees" but gave "no indication whether 
these defendants held additional management positions or owned large shares of corporate 
stock," they would be treated "as outside directors. As a result, [the] complaint must connect 
the allegations of fraud to these particular defendants." Id. at 226. In Klein v. Goetz:.mann, 770 
F. Supp. 78 (N.D.N.Y. 1991 ), the court found that outside directors, including those on an 
Audit Committee and who signed the 10-K and allegedly signed an Annual Report were 
not "insiders" for "group pleading." See id. at 81-82. In Thornock v. Kinderhill Corp., 712 F. 
Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the plaintiffs bought limited partnership interests, and Kinderhill 
Corporation was a general partner. The court found: 
The Complaint does not allege that the outside directors [of Kinderhill] made any 
misrepresentations or omissions. The alleged misrepresentations were contained solely 
in the private placement memoranda and other documents "distributed by the Kin-
derhill defendants" generally without differentiation among defendants. There are no 
allegations that the outside directors participated in the management of Kinderhill or 
of partnerships named as defendants in this action. 
Id. at 1128-29 (footnote omitted). Continuing, the court noted: 
Although it is true that where defendants are insiders or affiliates participating in an 
offer of securities, "no specific connection between fraudulent representations in [an] 
Offering Memorandum and particular defendants is necessary," plaintiffs have cited no 
such rule where the defendants were outside directors who are not alleged to have 
participated in the offer of securities in question, and where no facts allege the contrary. 
Id. at 1129 (citation omitted). 
94. More specifically, in In re Livent, Inc. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), the 
outside directors moved to dismiss because the complaint did not make specific allegations 
of wrongdoing by the defendants. As the court explained, 
[p]laintiffs contend, however, that the Complaint meets the particularity requirement 
by alleging that the Outside Directors, as members of the Audit Committee, were re-
sponsible for reviewing Livent's reporting procedures, internal controls, and manage-
ment information systems, and the performance of [the auditor], and primarily respon-
sible for reviewing the unaudited quarterly financials. The Complaint also alleges that 
the Outside Directors failed to investigate, or ignored, the "red flags" signaling the fraud. 
Id. at 219. The court found that "[t]he Outside Directors are alleged to have been reckless 
in not discovering such schemes and in participating in the approval and dissemination of 
the misstatements in the documents filed with the SEC. The particularity with which the 
'red flags' are alleged, combined with the group pleading doctrine, meets the 9(b) standard." 
Id. In Greenfield v. Prqfessional Care, 677 F. Supp. 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), the plaintiffs alleged that 
three individual defendants "served as members of [the issuer's] audit committee, in which 
capacity they were responsible for monitoring [the issuer's] internal and external audit func-
tions, control systems, financial accounting and reporting, and adherence to applicable legal, 
ethical and regulatory requirements." Id. at 114-15 (citation omitted). "[T]he complaint 
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to-day involvement" test in the Ninth Circuit, and non-officer directors 
are at considerably more risk of being "group pleaded" into a case in New 
York than in California. 
Lawyers, accountants, and independent broker/dealers, on the other 
hand, are generally not "insiders or affiliates" for Luce purposes in a cor-
porate setting any more than they are in the limited partnership context. 95 
charges that each of these defendants signed an amended registration statement on l\fay 30, 
1995, and a Form I OK on January 9, 1986, after the corporation was informed of New York 
State's investigation and after the Albany office director informed [the issuer's] corporate 
counsel of the ongoing fraud." Id. at 115. The court held that "[w)hile there is some dispute 
as to whether these defendants should be treated as insiders or outsiders, on the facts pleaded 
these defendants appear to be much closer to the position of an inside director than they are 
to that of a typical outside director." Id. See, e.g., Hallet v. Li & Fung, Ltd., [1996-1997 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 99,318, at 95,909-10 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 23, 1996) (denying 
motion to dismiss by defendant Hsieh and stating, "[a)lthough Hsieh was an outside director, 
he sat on the board to represent Cyrk's largest shareholder, Li & Fung BVI. The complaint 
alleges that, in addition to being Cyrk's largest shareholder, Li & Fung receives more than 
$2 million in fees for locating manufacturers in Asia for Cyrk's promotional products. The 
complaint also alleges that Hsieh sat on Cyrk board committees and had access to Cyrk's 
internal forecasts, budgets and plans. Plaintiff claims that Hsieh regularly reported to Li & 
Fung about Cyrk's business, plans, and future prospects. Each of the defendants is alleged to 
have signed [the) Registration Statement, to have had power and influence over Cyrk, and 
to have caused it to engage in illegal practices. Furthermore, Li & Fung BVI sold all of its 
shares ofCyrk during the class period. Li & Fung BVI is specifically charged in the complaint 
with having orchestrated, with Cyrk's 'top officers,' a publicity campaign in order to keep 
stock prices high until they sold their shares. The complaint also specifically alleges that 
'Cyrk's insiders and largest shareholder worked closely with Montgomery Securities,' Cyrk's 
underwriter, to accomplish the fraudulent scheme. The facts as pleaded support the reason-
able inference that Hsieh participated in the allegedly fraudulent representations and was 
aware of the adverse information ... alleged to contradict those optimistic representations. 
In short, the allegations support the inference that Hsieh is more akin to a corporate insider 
than an outside director.") (footnotes and citations omitted); MTG Elec. Techs. Shareholders 
Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 979-80 (E.D.N.Y 1995) (denying motion to dismiss by two members 
of audit committee by noting, "[defendants] argue that they are 'outsiders,' ... I find these 
arguments unconvincing .... [These defendants] are alleged to have signed prospectuses 
containing materially false and misleading information. Moreover, [they] together constituted 
the Audit Committee-a committee charged with the responsibility of overseeing the work of 
[the auditor] ... [P]laintiffs' allegations ... reveal fraud, theft of securities and the fabrication 
of financial information by senior management at [the issuer]. In short, the complaint alleges 
massive accounting fraud during the class period. Considering that [the two defendants] were 
charged with overseeing the conduct of [the issuer's] accountants[,] I would conclude that 
the complaint satisfies ... Rule 9(b), even if the allegations against them were limited to their 
status at [the issuer] and their signing of fraudulent prospectuses.") (footnote omitted); Kim-
mel v. Labenski, (1987-1988 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 93,651, at 97 ,990 
(S.D.N.Y Feb. 9, 1988) (finding that Luce insiders or affiliates "arguably" included three 
outside directors who signed I OK). 
95. See Fisk, 927 F. Supp. at 727-28 (distinguishing "lawyers [and] accountants," among 
others, from Luce "insiders"). There is no reason that attorneys and accountants should be 
"insiders" in the corporate context if they are not in the limited partnership setting, and the 
cases in note 80 supra, should apply to attorneys and accountants engaged to represent 
corporations. 
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Nor is a commercial bank providing some of the financing for a project.96 
Large shareholders of an allegedly offending issuer generally should not 
be "group pleaded" into a case under Second Circuit law. One decision 
finds that two companies that held stock in the issuer and shared directors 
with the issuer could not be "grouped" into a case because there was "no 
allegation of interaction among or between these corporate entities suffi-
cient to justify the treatment of [the two stockholders] as insiders,"97 and 
another suggests that shareholders become insiders only if they play "active 
daily roles in the relevant companies or transactions."98 The "insider or 
affiliate" test, however, is so loose that some decisions are bizarre.99 
96. In Burke v. Dowling, 944 E Supp. l 036 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), the court held the bank which 
allegedly "assisted the preparation of the acquisition, financing, and historical sections" of 
one Private Placement Memorandum in an alleged Ponzi scheme to convert Irish castles into 
luxury hotels, and "assisted in the preparation of the acquisition financing sections" of a 
second Private Placement Memorandum was not an insider, even though the bank was the 
primary lender for both projects. Id. at 1063. It noted that "[m]ere preparation of sections 
of an offering mcmorand[um], however, docs not make a drafter an 'insider or affiliate.' 
\'\1ithout a more specific indication as to what statements in the offering memorandum [the 
bank] drafted, plaintiffs cannot allege fraud in the sale of securities under § I O(b) on [the 
bank's] part." Id. at l 063-64. 
97. Brickman v. Tyco Toys, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1054, l 061 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
98. Polar Int'! Brokerage Corp. v. Reeve, 108 F. Supp. 2d 225, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In 
this case, the court held that "group pleading" was available against a company formed for 
acquisition, the private equities firm organizing that company, independent directors of the 
seller who served on the board committee evaluating the offer, other individuals at the seller 
who agreed to invest in the acquiring company, and investment banking defendants who 
invested in the acquiring company. Id. at 238. The court found it was not available, however, 
against insurance companies who invested in the acquiring company as institutional investors, 
holding: 
it is impossible to characterize the Insurance Company Defendants as corporate insiders 
with direct involvement in the daily activities of the relevant companies or intimate 
knowledge of the challenged transaction .... The Insurance Company Defendants' 
status as institutional investors in [the acquiring company] is insufficient to render them 
corporate insiders such that the group pleading doctrine applies. 
Id. See also Isanaka v. Spectrum Technologies. USA Inc., No. 99-CV-1358 (LEK/DRH), 2001 WL 
19791 l, at *5-*6 (N. D.N. Y. Feb. 18, 200 I), in which the court interpreted prior district court 
decisions to apply group pleading to individuals with direct involvement in the everyday 
business of the company who are in a narrow group of high ranking officers or directors 
participating in the preparation and dissemination of a document. 
99. Friedman v. Treasure Island N.V., No. 90Civ.2882 (PKL), 1992 WL 11137 l (S.D.N.Y. 
May 4, 1992), is one of the worst, though it dismisses the case on bases other than plaintiffs' 
failure to connect defendants with misrepresentations or omissions. Id. at* 11. Plaintiffs had 
purchased debentures. The issuer's parent and sole shareholder was a joint venture. The 
Plaintiffs named 27 defendants and the court found that all but one (a corporate defendant) 
were insiders or affiliates for purposes of the Second Circuit "group pleading" rule. Id. at* l, 
*6. These included: the joint venture/parent, the nine companies that were the joint ven-
turers, the "principals" of the joint venture (nine individuals, seven of whom were also di-
rectors of the issuer, and one trust), and the subsidiaries through which the issuer did business. 
One individual defendant was simply a member of the board of the joint venture, but 
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Although it is hard to find a clean decision addressing whether under-
writers in a firm commitment underwriting are within the Luce pleading 
exception, Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. Nat f!Vtist Finance, Inc. 1 oo suggests that such 
underwriters risk being swept into the group. Gabriel denied a motion to 
dismiss by two firms that were initial purchasers of notes that they then 
sold to institutional investors, including the plaintiffs. The firms moved to 
dismiss on the ground that the complaint did not identify which statements 
they supposedly authored in the Offering Memorandum. The court found 
that activities underwriters typically perform placed these defendants 
within the Luce "group:" "Plaintiffs allege that NatWest and McDonald 
arranged the financing of these Notes, drafted the Offering Memorandum, 
went on road shows, and sold the Notes to plaintiffs and others. Those 
allegations are sufficient to cast NatWest and McDonald as 'insiders or 
affiliates.'" 101 
Similar to the Ninth Circuit's "day-to-day" involvement test, the Second 
Circuit's "insider" test does not distinguish well between officers. All of-
ficers are "insiders" in the sense that they work inside the issuer. The cases 
reveal no limiting principle, such as the "functional relationship" concept 
that some district courts in the Ninth Circuit have employed, and the 
Second Circuit itself has not emphasized, as did the Ninth Circuit in Wool, 
that the circle of officers should be restricted to those directly involved in 
preparing the violating documents. The Second Circuit "group" can ac-
cordingly reach into a corporation below the top officer level to embrace, 
for example, a manager of marketing, 102 the president of a subunit within 
was not a director or officer of the issuer. He was nevertheless "alleged to have been [an] .. 
. insider by virtue of his beneficial ownership of 2112% of the common stock of [the issuer]." 
Id. at *6. 
100. 94 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
IOI. Id. at 502-03 (citation omitted). The court was unmoved by the argument that 
NatWest and McDonald were "initial purchasers, not underwriters" under Rule 144A. Id. 
at 503. "Although NatWest and McDonald were not underwriters for purposes of the 1933 
Act, their participation in the financing and sale of the Notes, especially with respect to 
drafting the Offering Memorandum, make them 'insiders or affiliates' under Luce." Id. See 
also Waltree Ltd. v. ING Furman Sel<:, UC, 97 F. Supp. 2d 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), where the 
plaintiff sued both ING Bank (Bank) and ING Barings (Barings). Bank had loaned money to 
Tatarstan and issued notes, which Barings "placed" and plaintiff bought. The complaint did 
not address the corporate relationship between Bank and Barings and lumped both defen-
dants together. The court found that "group pleading" was appropriate because the facts of 
that relationship were exclusively within the defendants' knowledge. Id. at 469 n.6. The court 
noted, "there is little dispute that both ING entities were intimately involved in the Loan 
and the issuance of the Notes," and the court held the allegations put the defendants on 
sufficient notice of the charges against them. Id. 
l 02. See, e.g., MTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 984 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(finding one defendant to be an "insider" where that individual was the Manager of Mar-
keting, was the son of one and the nephew of another of the two most powerful officers of 
corporation, marketed products in the United States, was listed in numerous press releases 
as the contact person at the corporation, was a defendant in a suit for fraudulent conversion 
of company stock, and "clearly had at least peripheral involvement in the Chinese joint 
venture agreements ... " that were at the heart of the case). 
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the corporation, 103 corporate secretaries, 104 and vice presidents. 105 As in 
the Ninth Circuit, however, officers or directors in Second Circuit cases 
whose tenures fall outside a class period should not be within a "group." 106 
I 03. The court in Mcholas v. Poughkeepsie Savings Bank/ FSB, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 95,606 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1990), relied on Ouaknine to deny 
Michael Feeks' motion to dismiss in a case where plaintiffs alleged misrepresentations and 
omissions regarding the adequacy of loan loss reserves and quality of loan underwriting. Id. 
at 97,842. The court stated: 
Feeks was ... the President of the Bank's Community Bank Group and as such oversaw 
and was actively supported by the Bank's commercial real estate division. As alleged in 
the complaint, the Bank's commercial real estate division and the loans within the 
commercial real estate lending portfolios were a primary source of the falsity of defen-
dants' overstatements of the Bank's earnings, income and net assets by the understate-
ment of its loan loss provisions and non-performing assets. 
Id. The court went on to write: 
Id. 
In the Bank's 1987 and 1988 Annual Reports, defendant Feeks is prominently listed as 
the second-ranking officer of the Bank .... As such, all statements of the Bank concern-
ing, inter alia, the adequacy of its loan loss reserves, its 'high-quality' loan portfolio ... 
are also properly attributed to Fceks as the second-ranking officer of the Bank. 
104. See Neubauer v. Eva-Health USA, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 281, 283, 284 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(" [P] osition as corporate secretary is sufficient to link [defendant] to the offering memoran-
dum under Luce." Although this defendant had the same last name as the chairman/CEO 
and allegedly resided at the same address, the court appeared to give these facts small con-
sideration, saying, in the context of analyzing "control person" allegations that "[g]iven the 
infinite variations in human relationships, her place of residence adds nothing of significance 
.... "). See also Klein v. Goetzmann, 770 E Supp. 78, 82 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding defendants 
not included within "group" by virtue of membership on board or Audit Committee, but 
"[t]he allegation that defendant Smith was secretary of the corporation is sufficient ... to 
bring him within the Second Circuit's 'group pleading' rule .... "). 
105. See In re Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 209 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) 
("[T]he group pleading presumption applies to Hirsh and Myers. Hirsh and Myers are 
alleged to have been officers of Health Management or of its wholly owned subsidiary. Myers 
is alleged to have been Health Management's Vice President for Program Development. 
Hirsh is aJleged to have been Vice President for Purchasing and Managed Care Contracts 
at HMI Pennsylvania. Although Hirsh and Myers may not have been top level officers of 
Health Management, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have alleged that they were 'insiders,' 
falling within the group pleading presumption."). But, note also that in this case plaintiffs 
alleged specific involvement by each of these two defendants in identified wrongdoing. One 
of them was allegedly present at the meeting during which an "in transit" inventory scheme 
was devised; the other allegedly prepared false paperwork to document an inventory transfer 
that had not occurred. 
106. For instance in Brickman v. Tyco Toys, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), an 
individual defendant was not an insider where he did not join the board until after the class 
period, despite allegations that he controlled the issuer's directors. See id. at I 061. The court 
reasoned: 
although the amended complaint describes [this defendant] as "an insider," he did not 
become a ... director until three months after the end of the proposed class period, 
and plaintiff concedes that, prior to attaining that position, this defendant had not had 
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TO WHAT COMMUNICATIONS DOES THE LUCE 
EXCEPTION APPLY WHEN A CORPORATION IS THE 
ISSUER? 
Although the trio of limited partnership opinions authored by the Sec-
ond Circuit dealt with offering documents, and although some lower court 
decisions in the corporate context so limited "group pleading" when a 
corporation was the issuer, 107 that limitation has not prevailed.108 Indeed, 
such a limitation seemed likely to fail in a corporate setting given that Luce 
cited Somerville and Pellman with approval, and those decisions applied the 
pleading exception to annual reports, published financials, and proxy state-
ments.109 Subsequent opinions in the Second Circuit apply "group plead-
ing" in a corporate setting to those documents as well as press releases 
and SEC filings.110 At least one case extends the concept to tender offer 
documents, 111 another applies it to an acquisition agreement in a sale of 
"any previous official involvement in [the issuer's] affairs .... "Moreover, the term "in-
sider" is conclusory and inexact. Plaintiff must define the type of conduct engaged in 
which renders each defendant liable for the misrepresentation at issue. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
I 07. See Pallickal v. Technology Intern., Ltd., No. 94CIV.5 738 (DC), 1996 WL 153699, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 3, 1996) (granting motion to dismiss by President/ director of issuer and 
noting, "[t]he amended complaint does not allege that there was an offering memorandum. 
Thus, plaintiffs were required to allege facts specifically pertaining to [this defendant]."); 
Nein, 770 F. Supp. at 81 ("[I]his 'group pleading,' however, is limited to situations where 
the alleged misrepresentations are contained in an offering memorandum .... "). 
108. See, e.g., Axe!Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 847 F. Supp. 317, 321 (S.D.N.Y 
1994) (applying Luce to annual financial statements of a corporation, whose stock was pur-
chased by another company and finding defendant "has not suggested a rational basis for 
distinguishing an offering memorandum from other materials issued by the seller and fore-
seeably relied on by the buyer to put this case outside of the Luce rule"). 
109. See text accompanying supra notes 69-73. 
110. See generally Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1989) (annual report, 10-Ks, and 
press releases); Furman v. Sherwood, 833 F. Supp. 408, 417 n.6 (S.D.N.Y 1993) ("In cases 
like the one at bar, where the alleged false and misleading statements were made in [the 
issuer's] annual report and Company press releases, no such connection [between an indi-
vidual defendant and the fraud] need be pied because such documents are presumed to entail 
the collective actions of the directors and officers."); Nicholas v. Poughkeepsie Sav. Bank/ 
FSB, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) iJ 95,606 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 26, 
1990) (proxy statements and annual reports); Runes v. Gridcomm, Inc., No. B-86-473-
TFGD, 1990 WL 483735 (D. Conn.Jan. 3, 1990) (SEC filings and press releases); Quantum 
Overseas, N.V. v. Touche Ross & Co., 663 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y 1987) (SEC filings). 
111. See Polar Int'! Brokerage Corp. v. Reeve, 108 F. Supp. 2d 225, 238 (S.D.N.Y 2000) 
("With respect to Trinity, KKR, the Individual Defendants and the Investment Bank Defen-
dants, ... group pleading tactics are appropriate. As demonstrated by the Offer Documents 
themselves, all of these defendants were intimately involved both in negotiating the Offer 
and in drafting the allegedly fraudulent Solicitation and Tender Offer Statement. For ex-
ample, the Solicitation-which was issued on behalf of Trinity, Willis Corroon and KKR-
includes letters to Willis Corroon shareholders from five of the Individual Defendants and 
all of the Investment Bank Defendants."). 
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assets for stock, 11 2 and yet another appears to employ "group pleading" 
to deny a 9(b) motion where the misrepresentations allegedly occurred in 
letters relating to the purchase of stock from minority shareholders. 113 
The Second Circuit formula-sweeping in "insiders and affiliates"-
focuses less on whether a defendant actually prepared the misstatement 
than on his or her relationship to the offending entity or the transaction 
in which the misstatement occurred. Perhaps for this reason, district court 
opm1ons are inconsistent in their application of group pleading to oral 
statements. 114 One decision even suggests that a letter to shareholders 
112. In Nationwide Cellular Service, Inc. v. American Mobile Communications, [1991-1992 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 96,435 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 29, 1991), AMC sold assets to 
Nationwide for stock. Nationwide sued for fraud, naming AMC shareholders in the suit. The 
court summarized the allegations as charging that 
the AMC shareholders were all parties to the [Asset Acquisition Agreement], and ... 
that the AMC Shareholders collectively owned over 90% of the issued and outstanding 
common stock of AMC; each of the individual AMC Shareholders was an officer and/ 
or director of AMC; and each ... actively participated, either directly or through agents, 
in the negotiation and consummation of the transaction .... 
Id. at 91,890 n.5 (citation omitted). The court then found that group pleading against these 
defendants was permissible and noted that "the majority of the misrepresentations Nation-
wide alleges are contained in either the June 1989 financial statements, upon which the Assets 
Acquisition Agreement was predicated, or in the Agreement itself." Id. at 91,890. See also 
Elliot Assocs., L.P. v. Hayes, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 91,283, at 95,593 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2000) (finding "Operative Documents" to be "group-published" and 
defining Operative Documents to be a Certificate of Designations for preferred stock, a 
Preferred Stock Investment Agreement, and a Registration Rights Agreement (id. at 95,589)). 
113. See Aquilio v. Manaker, Nos. 90-CV-45, 91-CV-93, 1991 WL 207473, at *12 
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 1991) (discussing application of Rule 9(b) to common law fraud claim, 
and characterizing complaint as alleging that the "letters [were] condoned by all defendants 
in their capacities [as] members of the SAA board"; providing "cf" citation to "group plead-
ing" case), on reconsideration ef other issues, 1992 WL 144303 (N.D.N.Y. June 19, 1992). 
114. Several courts have declined to apply "group pleading" to oral statements: Elliot 
Assocs., L.P. v. Covance, Inc. [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 91,269, at 95,489 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2000) ("To allow group pleading in the context of oral statements would 
unduly expand its ambit beyond that contemplated by the Second Circuit when it adopted 
the theory."); Neubauer v. Eva-Health USA, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 281, 283-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(applying Luce to alleged misrepresentations in offering memorandum, but separately ana-
lyzing oral misrepresentation claims and dismissing them in part because plaintiffs failed to 
allege "by whom" they were made); In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp. 1252, 
1261-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), eff'd in part and rev'd in part (on other grounds), 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 
1993) ("The specificity requirements for pleading actionable statements are relaxed in the 
case of offering memoranda because they are documents of vital importance to any issuing 
company, and accordingly can be presumed to result from collaborative effort by senior 
officers of a defendant corporation. The statements in question here, by contrast, were alleged 
to have been uttered by unnamed spokespersons or even more shadowy figures who are not 
shown to have been known to defendants, and who, from the pleadings, cannot be said to 
have been within the defendants' control when they made the alleged statements."); Ohman 
v. Kahn, 685 F. Supp. 1302, 1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding alleged misrepresentations in 
telephone call and face-to-face meetings "do not involve the preparation of corporate doc-
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specifically attributed to a single, indentified defendant might be subject 
to the pleading shortcut.115 
ABUSE OF THE PLEADING PROTOCOL 
As the development of "group pleading" in the Ninth and Second Cir-
cuit demonstrates, this protocol is a judicially created pleading presump-
tion to permit plaintiffs to name defendants without honoring the other-
wise applicable requirement that no defendant should be named in a fraud 
uments by insiders which can obviate the need for particularizing among the defendants. As 
a result [these allegations] must be repleaded to specify the speaker, the approximate time of 
communication and the content of the communication."). Several decisions appear to have 
permitted "group pleading" where oral statements were involved, albeit without analyzing 
the difficulties of applying that concept when defendants speak rather than write: Cosmas, 
886 F.2d at 10 (alleged misstatement made by CEO in magazine interview); Benedict v. 
Amaducci, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 98,830, at 93,010 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 11, 1995) (explaining the reach of Luce and citing Cosmas: "courts have sustained a finding 
of fraud against all the directors of a corporation for statements made by the corporation in 
public filings and by a sole director in a magazine article."); In re AnnTaylor Stores Sec. 
Litig., 807 F. Supp. 990, 996, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying motions to dismiss where one 
of the aftermarket statements was made by "an AnnTaylor spokesperson" who said that the 
company was "comfortable" with an analyst earnings estimate, and writing that the individ-
ual defendants, "each of whom is alleged to have been aware of the dissemination and content 
of the allegedly fraudulent after-market statements through press releases and the media, 
need not be directly responsible for making each of the misstatements during the Class Period 
in order to satisfy the requirements of Rule 9(b)."). In Mann v. Levy, 776 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991 ), defendant Levy was identified as an officer and director of the issuer as well as a 
lawyer who represented the issuer and its president in connection with the private stock 
transaction in this case. He argued that the complaint failed to attribute any of the alleged 
false statements directly to him-the fraud was failure to reveal $2 million in returned mer-
chandise. Levy had attended meetings where oral representations were made to plaintiff that 
the issuer had "great potential," had "turned the corner," was a "terrific company," had 
been in contact with additional investors prepared to infuse capital, and had initiated ne-
gotiations with a factor to provide cash flow. Levy participated in the telephone call to 
persuade plaintiffs to buy company notes that were in default, and he was also present at a 
meeting with the president, the factor, and plaintiff at which the factor stated that it was 
prepared to resume the factoring agreement. The court held: 
Where, as here, plaintiff alleges with particularity the content of the statements sued 
upon, the time and place at which they were made, and the fact that the speaker was 
one of at most five persons-all of whom are allegedly officers and directors of [the 
issuer] (or a single representative of its factor)-we find the requirements of Rule 9(b) 
have been met. 
Id. at 813 (citing Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
115. See Nicholas, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 95,606. The 
complaint included an allegation that a letter written by defendant Kinkade was misleading 
and, although the opinion is not entirely clear, the statements in it were among those ap-
parently attributed to defendant Feeks. Id. at 97,838, 97,842. The decision does not address 
the conceptual difficulties of applying group pleading to statements expressly attributed to 
one defendant. 
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case without specifically alleging that defendant's role in the fraud. 116 By 
their terms, W&ol and Luce addressed a pleading question. 117 
Some decisions, however, either misunderstand the "group pleading" 
concept or wrongly expand upon it, (i) by apparently transmuting it into 
a rule of substantive law applicable on summary judgment motions; 118 
(ii) by converting this pleading presumption into a rebuttable evidentiary 
presumption; I 19 or (iii) by allowing plaintiffs to continue to rely on "group 
116. Decisions from both circuits recognize that "group pleading" is an exception to the 
otherwise applicable requirements of Rule 9(b). See, e.g., In re Oak Tech. Sec. Litig., No. 96-
20552 SW, 1997 WL 448168, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. l, 1997) ("Rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff 
to attribute fraudulent acts or statements to a particular defendant. However, the Ninth 
Circuit has recognized an exception to this rule .... ") (citing Wool v. Tandem Computers 
Cnc., 818 E2d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1987)) (additional citation omitted); Rubin v. Trimble, 
No. C-95-4353 MMC, 1997 WL 227956, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 1997) ("Under Rule 
9(b), plaintif!S generally must attribute each fraudulent statement or act to a particular de-
fendant. An exception to this rule is the 'group pleading' doctrine, under which plaintiffs 
need not identify each corporate officer or director who participated in drafting group-
published information such a prospectuses, registration statements, annual reports and press 
releases.") (citing Jn re GlenFed Inc. Sec. Litig., 60 E3d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1995) and Wool, 
818 E2d at 1440) (additional citation omitted); ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay 
Int'l Corp., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '!199,345, at 96, l 00 
(S.D.N.Y Jan. 22, 1997) (referencing "the Luce exception to the general rule that fraud 
allegations against multiple defendants must identify each defendant with each act alleged 
against it"); Parnes v. Mast Property Investors, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 792, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
("As a general rule, plaintif!S claiming fraud must draw a specific connection between the 
allegedly fraudulent statements and each defendant .... However, an exception to that rule 
is made where, as here, plaintiff alleges that an offering memorandum was fraudulent and 
defendants are insiders or affiliates who participated in the offer of the securities.") (citing 
Luce, 802 E2d at 55). 
117. The Wool discussion that concludes with the "group publication" language is titled 
"Rule 9(b) Motion." At its outset, it identifies the issue as a pleading question: 
The individual defendants contended, and the district court concluded, that Wool's 
allegations against the individual defendants failed to satisfy the particularity require-
ment of Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) .... [llhe individual defendants argued that the allegations 
in W'ool's complaint were insufficient against them because: ... the activities of each of 
the individual defendants were not separately and specifically identified. 
818 F.2d at 1439. 
Similarly, the "group pleading" language in Luce lies under the heading "Sufficiency of 
the Complaint," discusses Rule 9(b) explicitly and responds to the district court's dismissal 
of the complaint on the basis that it "fail [ed] to connect allegations of fraudulent represen-
tations to particular defendants." 802 F.2d at 54. 
118. See Golden v. Terre Linda Corp., No. 95C065 7, 1996 WL 426760, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 
July 26, 1996) (relying on Blake v. Dierdor!T, 856 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1988), and denying 
motion for summary judgment by Chairman of the Board/Secretary on l O(b) claim; using 
"group pleading" authority to attribute to the moving defendant an allegedly false and mis-
leading representation that the corporation's stock would be registered, a representation 
made in a letter signed by a vice president). 
119. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 E Supp. 746, 759-60 (N.D. Cal. 1997) 
(granting summary judgment as to some defendants and stating, " [ u] nder the group pleading 
doctrine, in drafting a complaint, plaintiffs may rely on a presumption that statements in 
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pleading" after they have had discovery. 120 Better-reasoned cases are clear 
that "group published information is designed only to be a pleading device 
[rather than] ... a hook on which to hang liability" 121 and that plaintiffs 
must identify "statements made by ... individuals personally in order to 
survive summary judgment."122 
A handful of opinions make a second mistake by extending "group 
pleading" to scienter. 123 This confuses two questions: (i) what allegations 
'prospectuses, registration statements, annual reports, press releases, or other 'group pub-
lished information," are the collective work of those individuals with direct involvement in 
the day-to-day affairs of the company. This presumption is rebuttable, however. On summary 
judgment, a defendant may rebut the group pleading presumption by producing evidence 
that he had no involvement in creating the challenged document .... All four defendants 
aver that they were not involved in preparing or disseminating any of the class period doc-
uments. All four defendants also aver that they did not make any of the alleged false and 
misleading statements of October 19, 1995 and November 2, 1995. Defendant Ramsay was 
on sabbatical and vacation on those dates, and defendant Sekimoto, who resides in Japan, 
was not present either. Defendants Baskett and Burgess did not participate in the October 
19th conference call, and although they were present at the November 2nd meeting with 
analysts, their presentations did not involve financial forecasting, sales, or (the product in-
volved in the case).") (citations omitted). See also In re 3Com Sec. Litig., 761 F. Supp. 1411, 
1414-15 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (denying motion to dismiss where defendants argued that many 
challenged statements were "attributable only to Mr. Krause," on the basis that the group 
publication "presumption may be rebutted by a later showing that defendant Krause's state-
ments did not reflect the collective actions of the other defendants."). 
120. See In re Wall Data Sec. Litig., (1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
'IJ 99,292, at 95,747-48 (W.D. Wash. June 25, 1996) (rejecting argument on motion to 
dismiss Second Amended Complaint that, in light of substantial discovery, court should revisit 
"group pleading" and hold plaintiffs to a higher standard for allegations against individual 
defendants). 
121. In re Interactive Network, Inc. Sec. Litig., 948 F. Supp. 917, 922 (N.D. Cal. 1996). 
122. Schlagel v. Learning Tree, Int'!, (1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
'IJ 90,403, at 91,816 n.5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1998). 
123. See, e.g., In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 976, 995 (E.D. Mo. 
1999) (relying on "group pleading" to attribute knowledge to defendants to satisfy a negli-
gence standard for section 14 claims and scienter requirement for IO(b) claims and stating, 
"The group pleading doctrine ... attributes knowledge of this information to all officers and 
directors with inside information of or involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the corpo-
ration."); In re Newbridge Networks Sec. Litig., 767 F. Supp. 275, 282 (D.D.C. 1991) (refer-
encing group published information authorities in scienter discussion). Other cases, which 
are more properly characterized as "group scienter" cases, hold on the basis of related but 
separate reasoning that scienter may be pleaded by group allegations. These cases reason 
that some information is so important to a corporation that it is presumably known by officers 
or directors. For example, in Epstein v. Itron, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D. Wash. 1998), the 
court found, "facts critical to a business's core operations or an important transaction gen-
erally are so apparent that their knowledge may be attributed to the company and its key 
officers." Id. at 1326. Epstein cites Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1989), for this prop-
osition. But the Cosmas discussion of this matter, under the "Scienter" heading, id. at 12-13, 
is separate from the discussion of particularity in identifying which defendants were respon-
sible for particular misstatements, id. at 11-12. This Article will not address these "group 
scienter" cases, except to note that they seem contrary to the direction that, in private actions 
for damages under lO(b), the plaintiff must plead "with particularity facts giving rise to a 
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are sufficient to hold defendants responsible for making a statement (which 
"group pleading" does address); and (ii) what allegations are sufficient to 
plead defendants' knowledge that the statement is false (which "group 
pleading" does not address). Most decisions considering this matter have 
correctly held that the two questions are separate. l 24 
THE EFFECT OF CENTRAL BANK 
Turning from the elaboration of "group pleading" and its proper use 
to whether it should be employed at all, there are three issues: (i) whether 
such pleading is consistent with the post-Central Bank focus on pri-
mary liability; (ii) whether "group pleading" survives the PSLRA; and 
(iii) whether the assumptions underlying the pleading protocol reflect the 
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(2) ( 1994 & Supp. V 1999). It is hard to see how a general allegation that a matter was 
important to a company's overall business states particular facts providing a strong inference 
that a certain defendant knew a specific fact and considered it material. 
124. In Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1986), the complaint was based largely on 
allegations that the defendants made specific promises to induce the securities transactions 
while secretly intending not to carry them out or knowing that they could not be carried out. 
In remanding with the direction that plaintiffs should be permitted to amend, the court stated 
that amendments "relating to projections or expectations offered to induce investments must 
allege particular facts demonstrating the knowledge of defendants at the time that such 
statements were false." Id. at 5 7. See also Jacobs v. Coopers & Lybrand, L.L.P., [1999 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 90,443, at 92,036-37 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1999) ("Plaintiffs 
argue that Hirsch should be charged with knowledge of the material misstatements contained 
in Happiness's 1995 financial disclosure documents under the 'group pleading doctrine,' 
embraced by the Second Circuit .... However, even under the group pleading doctrine, a 
complaint must allege that the defendants are 'insiders or affiliates' and must allege 'particular 
facts demonstrating the knowledge of each of the defendants at the time that the statements 
were false.' ... [I]he Second Amended Complaint alleges no facts other than that Hirsch 
was a director, a member of the audit committee, and a signatory of the 10-K form; it does 
not allege facts demonstrating that Hirsch knew at the time that the statements were false.") 
(citation omitted); ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay Int'! Corp., [1996-1997 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 99,345, at 96, I 00 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1996) ("ESl's 
complaint must satisfy the two requirements of the Luce exception: (I) that the defendants 
are insiders or affiliates participating in the offer of the securities in question ... ; and, 
(2) that the complaint alleges particular facts demonstrating the knowledge of defendants at 
the time that the statements were false .... ");Ackerman v. National Property Analysts, Inc., 
887 F. Supp. 494, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (" [I]he Luce exception does not relieve a plaintiff from 
properly pleading allegations which demonstrate that each defendant knew or had reason to 
know of the false statements and material omissions in the offering material."). See also In re 
Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 190 F.R.D. 331, 336 (D.N.J. 1999) (granting outside director 
motion to dismiss common law fraud count, and stating, "[b]ecause of their 'group pleading' 
approach, the plaintiffs have failed to allege that even one of the CUC outside directors was 
actually aware of any accounting irregularities."); In re The First Union Corp. Sec. Litig., 
128 F. Supp. 2d 871, 888 (W.D.N.C. 2001) (rejecting plaintiffs' effort to use group pleading 
to avoid specifically alleging scienter and finding "contrary even to pre-Reform Act law" the 
view that "because of their positions as corporate officers, defendants must have known of 
allegedly false and misleading nature of all the alleged misstatements"). 
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reality of corporate life. This section addresses Central Bank and primary 
liability. The next two sections discuss the two remaining questions. 
In Central Bank ef Denver v. First Interstate, I 25 the Supreme Court ruled that 
there is no aiding and abetting liability in private lOb-5 actions.126 The 
Second and Ninth Circuits have held that Central Bank's rationale precludes 
conspiracy liability as well. 127 Because Central Bank seems to contract the 
circle of possible securities law defendants and because "group pleading" 
permits plaintiffs to place defendants within the circle at least for purposes 
of a complaint, it is important to consider whether Central Bank affects the 
"group pleading" authorities. 
Few courts have directly considered this question. Several have held that 
Central Bank does not affect "group pleading."128 They have done so in 
part on the basis that Central Bank announces a substantive rule while f!l.iJol 
and Luce address only pleading,129 in part on the basis that "group plead-
ing" is used against defendants sued as primary violators rather than as 
aiders or abettors or conspirators, 130 and in part because the Supreme 
Court acknowledged in Central Bank that: 
125. 511 U.S.164(1994). 
126. Id. at 191. 
127. See Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 135 F.3d 837, 838 
(2d Cir. 1998); In re GlenFed, Inc., 60 F.3d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1995). 
128. See, e.g., In re American Bank Note Holographies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 424, 
442 (S.D.N.Y 2000) ("While it is true that there can be no aider and abettor liability under 
IO(b) ... , grouping defendants together in the complaint does not in itself make the alle-
gations defective. It is well settled that plaintiffs may engage in so-called group-pleading under 
IO(b) ... . ");In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 1999); In re 
Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 133, 142 (S.D.N.Y 1999) (relying on In re Health 
Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 208-09 (E.D.N.Y 1997)); In re Silicon Graph-
ics, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 99,325, at 95,963 
n.5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996); McDaid v. Sanders, No. C-95-20750, 1996 WL 241605, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 1996). See also Copperstone v. TCSI Corp., No. C97-3495SBA, 1999 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20978, at *52-*53 (N.D. Cal.Jan. 14, 1999) (noting argument by defen-
dants, to whom no statements were attributed, that Central Bank required their dismissal and 
stating immediately that "the Ninth Circuit recognizes the 'group published information' 
doctrine"). 
129. See Silicon Graphics, Inc., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 
95,963 n.5 ("Central Bank does not prohibit group pleading, it merely prohibits a private right 
of action for aiding and abetting liability."); McDaid, 1996 WL 241605, at *2 (same); In re 
MTG Electronic Techns. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 980-81 (E.D.N.Y 1995) 
("Even assuming arguendo that [after Central Bank] a corporate insider must be personally 
responsible for a particular misstatement ... in order to be primarily liable ... there is no 
reason to conclude that such responsibility must be specifically alleged in the complaint. 
Indeed, the rationale for the relaxed pleading requirements under Rule 9(b) suggests 
otherwise."). 
130. See O~rd Health Plans, Inc., 187 F.R.D. at 142 ("Although the Supreme Court has 
eliminated secondary liability for aiders and abettors ... primary liability under Rule I Ob-5 
may be imposed 'not only on persons who made fraudulent misrepresentations but also on 
those who had knowledge of the fraud and assisted in its perpetration."') (quoting S.E.C. v. 
FirstJersey Sec., Inc., IOI F.3d 1450, 1471 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Azrielli v. Cohen Law 
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The absence of § 1 O(b) aiding and abetting liability does not mean 
that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from 
liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity ... who em-
ploys a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or 
omission) on which a purchaser or a seller of securities relies may be 
liable as a primary violator under 1 Ob-5, assuming all of the require-
ments for primary liability ... are met. In any complex securities 
fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple violators. I 3 I 
The decisions dismissing Central Bank's effect on "group pleading" are 
too hasty. True enough, Central Bank is substantive rather than procedural 
and eliminates aiding and abetting liability without defining primary lia-
bility. The Supreme Court's decision, however, makes the definition of 
primary liability important. 132 Before Central Bank, adding a defendant as 
an alleged primary violator-by "group pleading" or otherwise-was of-
ten of little significance. If the defendant was not a primary violator, he or 
she might well be an aider and abettor or a co-conspirator. If plaintiffs 
erroneously identified the defendant as a primary violator, it might be a 
case of "no harm, no foul." After Central Bank, this is no longer true, and 
a defendant wrongly added as a primary violator might well not be a 
proper defendant under any theory and therefore altogether wrongly 
sued. 133 
Precisely because the definition of a primary violation has assumed 
greater importance after Central Bank, courts have devoted more attention 
to the issue. Although not in agreement with each other, the circuits have 
sharpened their definitions. This has critical importance for "group plead-
ing." Although only a procedural protocol, the purpose of "group plead-
ing" is to permit plaintiffs to name at the outset of a case defendants whose 
precise roles plaintiffs will not know until discovery, but who, because of 
Offices, 21 F.3d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1994)); Sunbeam, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1342 ("[I]n no way does 
[Central Bank] restrict the ability of a plaintiff to allege primary violations of SectionlO(b) 
against groups of defendants."). 
131. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191, quoted in part in Sunbeam, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1342. 
132. See Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 71 7, 721 n.2 (2d Cir. 1997) ("In pre-Central Bank 
cases, some courts did not distinguish precisely between primary liability and aiding and 
abetting liability."). See also Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1224 n.8 (10th 
Cir. 1996) ("Commentators have long recognized the vagaries in the borders between pri-
mary and secondary liability .... Central Bank ef Denver requires courts to delineate primary 
liability much more clearly.") (citation omitted). 
133. Aside from "control person" liability, it may be that plaintiffs cannot now name in 
a private IO(b) action any defendant who is not a primary violator. See Powers v. Eichen, 977 
F. Supp I 031, I 040 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that after Central Bank, "only primary participants 
in a section l O(b) violation may be held liable"); Silicon Graphics, Inc. [1996-1997 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,96 l (same). See also Arduini/Messina Partnership v. 
National Med. Fin. Servs. Corp., 74 F. Supp. 2d 352, 362 (S.D.N.Y 1999) ("[T]he only form 
of [section] IO(b) liability that remains viable [after Central Bank] is primary liability."); Ru-
binstein v. Skyteller, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 315, 322 (S.D.N.Y 1999) (same). 
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their positions, are so likely to be proper defendants that plaintiffs appro-
priately name them without pleading specific facts tying them to the fraud. 
Because, after Central Bank, defendants are named as primary violators, 
"group pleading" presumes that the facts will show each of these defendants 
to have played a primary violator's role. Accordingly, the criteria for in-
cluding a defendant through "group pleading" should be good predictors 
ofa primary violator role and must be evaluated by the criteria's predictive 
power for that purpose. Such an evaluation, in turn, begins with the def-
inition of a primary violation. 
In formulating that definition, some cases take an expansive view, and 
include as primary violators all those who participated in the preparation 
of a challenged statement. Others restrict primary liability to those who 
in fact wrote or spoke the offending words or numbers or to whom those 
words or numbers were specifically attributed. 134 If "group pleading" rules 
include within the "group" defendants who are unlikely to be primary 
violators under a particular circuit's definition of primary liability, then 
that circuit must either change the rules identifying the "group" or aban-
don "group pleading" altogether. With that in mind, this Article will now 
compare primary liability law to "group pleading" rules in the Ninth and 
Second Circuits. 
THE NINFH CIRCUIT: CENTRAL BANK LIKELY HAS A 
LIMITED EFFECT ON GROUP PLEADING 
In re Seftware Toolworks Inc. Securities Litigation 135 contains the most fre-
quently quoted Ninth Circuit comment on primary liability. That decision 
reversed summary judgment granted to accountants. 136 Plaintiffs con-
tended that the accounting firm violated section I O(b) by "participating in 
drafting ... two letters that Toolworks sent to the SEC ... [that] falsely 
stated that Toolworks did not have preliminary financial data available for 
the June quarter and misleadingly described the nature of Toolworks' 
134. See McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 5 7 E Supp. 2d 396, 429-30 (E.D. Tex. 1999) 
(noting that plaintiffs placed the decisions on primary liability in two categories, one pro-
moting "a 'bright line' test, under which liability attache[s] only if the defendant itself made 
an allegedly false or misleading statement[,]" and the other advocating a test under which 
"a defendant [who] played a 'significant role' in preparing a false statement" would also be 
primarily liable), motion.for reconsideration on other matters denied, 68 E Supp. 2d 759 (E.D. Tex. 
1999); MTG Elec. 1echs., 898 E Supp. at 986 (''./\t first blush, these cases seem to suggest two 
distinct approaches. On the one hand, some courts have adopted a bright line rule: if the 
defendant did not actually make the alleged misleading statement, it cannot be primarily 
liable no matter how much assistance the defendant may have rendered to those who did. 
On the other hand, some courts have adopted a rule that focuses on the degree of help 
rendered, holding that a defendant may be found primarily liable for statements of others in 
which the defendant substantially participated. Upon close scrutiny, however, these different 
approaches start to blur."). 
135. 50 E3d 615 (9th Cir. 1995). 
136. Id. at 629. 
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OEM contracts." 137 In granting judgment to the accountants, the district 
court had analyzed whether they had aided and abetted a IO(b) violation 
by Toolworks. By the time the Ninth Circuit decided the case, the Supreme 
Court had published Central Bank. The court of appeals therefore consid-
ered whether the accountants could be primarily liable: 
Despite Central Bank, we nevertheless consider this issue because the 
plaintiffs' complaint clearly alleges that Deloitte is primarily liable 
under section 1 O(b) for the SEC letters. In fact, the July 1 SEC letter 
stated that it "was prepared after extensive review and discussions 
with ... Deloitte" and actually referred the SEC to two Deloitte 
partners for further information. Similarly, the plaintiffs presented 
evidence that Deloitte played a significant role in drafting and editing 
the July 4 SEC letter. This evidence is sufficient to sustain a primary 
cause of action under section 1 O(b) and, as a result, Central Bank does 
not absolve Deloitte on these issues. 138 
More recently, the Ninth Circuit reversed a judgment as a matter oflaw 
that a trial court entered in favor ofa CEO/Board Chairman. 139 The trial 
court reasoned that "because [this defendant] did not participate in the 
drafting of the allegedly false financial statements, he did not make a state-
ment within the meaning of [section] IO(b)." 140 The CEO/Chairman, 
however, had signed SEC filings containing the financials, and the Ninth 
Circuit held that "[b]ecause [this defendant] signed the statements alleged 
to be false, the district court erred in making the blanket holding that [he] 
could not be a primary violator .... " 141 The court of appeals concluded 
that "when a corporate officer signs a document on behalf of the cor-
poration, that signature will be rendered meaningless unless the officer 
believes that the statements in the document are true." 142 In reaching 
its decision, the Ninth Circuit summarized Seflware Toolworks as holding 
137. Id. at 628. 
138. Id. at n.3 (citations omitted). 
139. Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 105 7, 1061 (9th Cir. 2000). 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 1063. 
142. Id. at 1061. It is difficult to determine what the Everex decision means for outside 
directors. The opinion focuses on a CEO, repeatedly refers to "corporate officers" and 
distinguishes some of the cases cited by the defendant as ones in which "the defendant was 
an outside director." Id. at 1062. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit cites to and quotes 
from In re ]WP Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y 1996), which held that audit 
committee members could be primarily liable for statements in SEC filings that they signed. 
The Ninth Circuit also recognizes that any defendant may be primarily liable for misstate-
ments or omissions in a document that it authors itself. See McGann v. Ernst & Young, 102 
F.3d 390, 397 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that an accounting firm might be liable for an allegedly 
false and misleading audit opinion that it knows will be included in a 10-K); Knapp v. Ernst 
& Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1441 (9th Cir. 1996) (accounting firm could be primarily liable 
for failure to include a going concern qualification in audit opinion). 
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"that substantial participation or intricate involvement in the prepara-
tion of fraudulent statements is grounds for primary liability even though 
that participation might not lead to the actor's actual making of the 
statements." 143 
In other decisions addressing primary liability, district courts in the 
Ninth Circuit have: (i) denied summary judgment to accountants for mis-
representations made in issuer press releases because of "a disputed issue 
of fact as to whether [the accountants] actively participated in the prep-
aration, review or release" of those publications; 144 (ii) denied a motion to 
dismiss brought by "attorneys [who allegedly] drafted the prospectus 
which contained misrepresentations and omissions";1 45 (iii) denied sum-
mary judgment to nonmanaging underwriters who "played little or no 
direct role in preparing the ... prospectus, or completing the primary due 
diligence investigation" but whose "names appeared on the final prospec-
tus";146 (iv) denied a motion to dismiss by a financial advisor who allegedly 
prepared an Information Circular to solicit shareholder approval of a 
merger and a Term Sheet used to sell debentures; 147 (v) denied a motion 
by an underwriter for summary judgment on misleading statements in a 
prospectus because its "participation in both drafting and decision-making 
[was] sufficient to establish a triable primary liability claim under [section] 
1O(b)"; 148 and (vi) denied motions to dismiss by three individuals who 
allegedly provided the false and misleading information about their com-
pany that was used in a press release by a merger partner and a solicitation 
to the merger partner's shareholders.149 On the other hand, the courts 
have granted a motion by an outside director to dismiss a primary liability 
claim because there was no allegation that he was "a substantial partici-
pant in a fraud perpetrated by others"15o and granted a motion for sum-
mary judgment to executives who submitted uncontested declarations that 
143. Howard, 228 F.3d at 1061 n.5. 
144. In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 968-72 (C.D. Cal. 1994). 
145. Employer Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler, & Garrett, 871 F. Supp. 381, 388-89 
(S.D. Cal. 1994), order on reconsideration ef other matters, 948 F. Supp. 942 (S.D. Cal. 1995). 
146. Jn re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
'If 98,485, at 91,312-13 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 1994) ("While it may be true they made no 
contribution to the preparation of the prospectus itself, the document as it was publicly 
disseminated had their name on it and gave no indication that it was not as much the product 
of the [nonmanaging underwriters) as it was of the managing underwriter."). 
14 7. Trafton v. Deacon Barclays De Zoete Wedd Ltd., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'If 98,481, at 91,281 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 1994). 
148. Flecker v. Hollywood Entertainment Corp., [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) 'If 99,436, at 96,862-63 (D. Or. Feb. 12, 1997) (noting also the underwriters' "roles as 
analysts, investment bankers and business advisors with extensive contacts with [issuer) de-
fendants [and) superior access to non-public information"). 
149. Trefion, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] F. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,295. 
150. In re Medeva Sec. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
'If 98,323, at 90,241 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 1994). 
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they had nothing to do with the company statements that the plaintiffs 
challenged. 151 
Some of the Ninth Circuit district court opinions unquestionably go too 
far and include as primary violators defendants who do not qualify for 
primary liability even under the Sqflware Toolworks "significant role in draft-
ing and editing" formula. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit definition itself is 
too broad, and does not respect the Supreme Court's abolition of aiding 
and abetting liability. This Article, however, will not address that question. 
Whether misguided or not, the breadth of the Ninth Circuit test for pri-
mary liability combined with its relatively narrow "group pleading" rule 
suggests that the two concepts generally do not war with one another. If 
a defendant really was a part of what U'<Jol described as a narrow group 
of individuals who had a direct involvement in preparing the offending 
document, then the defendant may well meet the test of playing the sig-
nificant role in drafting and editing that apparently suffices under Sqflware 
Toolworks for a primary violation. 
One aspect of Ninth Circuit "group pleading" law, however, is at odds 
with that circuit's primary liability decisions. GlenFed introduced the "day-
to-day" involvement test to determine whether outside directors would be 
within the publishing "group." The Moore decision and various district 
court opinions then employed that same test to determine whether certain 
other defendants were within the "group." 152 A defendant can be included 
within a "group" under this test, however, if that defendant, in GlenFed's 
words, "participated in the day-to-day corporate activities" 153 or, in Moore's 
words, "had day-to-day control over the fraudulent entit[y]." 154 By the 
terms of these tests, general involvement in "day-to-day" activities may 
suffice. Primary 1 O(b) liability under Sqflware Toolworks, however, hinges on 
whether the defendant played a significant role in drafting or editing the 
particular statement that is misleading, not whether the defendant played 
some other role in the corporation-even if that other role was so regular 
as to be "daily." 155 The "day-to-day" involvement test for "group plead-
ing" is out of sync with the Ninth Circuit's definition of primary liability. 
151. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) "ii 99,325, at 95,963 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996). See also Binder v. Gillespie, 
184 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment for an accounting firm 
on the basis that its participation in the preparation of unaudited quarterly reports was 
insufficient where deposition testimony showed that the accountants had "commented" on 
the quarterlies but had not been engaged to "review" them), cert. denied sub nom., Binder v. 
Wilson, 528 U.S. 1154 (2000). 
152. See supra notes 21-22, 33-36, and accompanying text. 
153. In re GlenFed Inc. Sec. Litig., 60 F.3d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1998). Oddly, GlenFed an-
nounces this standard in the context of a primary liability and "control person" discussion, 
but does not address how members of a "group" could, simply by participating in some day-
to-day corporate activities, become primarily liable for a particular misleading document. 
154. Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989). 
155. In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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THE SECOND CIRCUIT: CENTRAL BANK SHOULD LEAD 
TO A MASSIVE OVERHAUL OF GROUP PLEADING LAW OR 
AN ABOLITION OF GROUP PLEADING ALTOGETHER 
Shapiro v. Cantorl56 and Wright v. Ernst & Young UPl57 are arguably the 
two most important Second Circuit decisions addressing primary liability. 
Shapiro held that accountants whose only specifically alleged role was prep-
aration of projections attached to offering memoranda could not be pri-
marily liable for the memoranda's failure to disclose that one of the part-
nerships' principals was a convicted felon. 158 Shapiro quoted from an 
opinion in the MTG Electronics litigation in which the district court con-
cluded: 
[I]f Central Bank is to have any real meaning, a defendant must actually 
make a false or misleading statement in order to be held liable under 
Section lO(b). Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and 
abetting, and no matter how substantial that aid may be, it is not 
enough to trigger liability under Section lO(b).159 
Shapiro also quoted from the Tenth Circuit's decision in Anixter v. Home-
Stake Products Co., which reasoned that "in order for accountants to 'use or 
employ' a 'deception' actionable under the antifraud law, they must them-
selves make a false or misleading statement (or omission) that they know 
or should know will reach potential investors." 160 Speaking more generally, 
the Second Circuit wrote that a "claim under§ lO(b) must allege a defen-
dant has made a material misstatement or omission .... "161 
Wright held that an auditor could not be primarily liable for an issuer's 
publication of financial results where the press release did not mention the 
auditor and expressly stated that the release contained "unaudited" fig-
ures.162 The Second Circuit so decided even though plaintiffs alleged that 
the accountants had "signed ofY' on the numbers "with full knowledge of 
the fact that the market would and did interpret the release of these figures 
as having been approved by [the auditor]." 163 After again quoting from 
the lower court MTG Electronics decision, Wright held that: 
a secondary actor cannot incur primary liability under the Act for a 
statement not attributed to that actor at the time of its dissemination. 
Such a holding would circumvent the reliance requirements of the 
156. 123 F.3d 717 (2d Cir. 1997). 
15 7. 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999). 
158. Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 721. 
159. Id. at 720 (quoting In re MTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 
987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)). 
160. Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 720 (quoting Anixter, 77 F.3d at 1226). 
161. /d.at720-21. 
162. Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 
1104 (1999). 
163. Id. at 172. 
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Act .... Thus, the misrepresentation must be attributed to that spe-
cific actor at the time of public dissemination, that is, in advance of 
the investment decision.164 
If these two decisions were the universe, the Second Circuit rule would 
be clear. To be primarily liable under section lO(b), a defendant must 
actually make the challenged misstatement. Where the defendant is a "sec-
ondary actor" such as an accountant, and the misstatement is distributed 
by others, the misstatement must be specifically attributed to the secondary 
actor. 
This clear picture, however, is clouded by two other Second Circuit 
opinions: SEC v. First Jersey Securities, Inc. 165 and SEC v. US. Environmental, 
Inc.166 First Jersey Securities was a broker-dealer with branch offices 
throughout the United States. Its sales force frequently sold "units" com-
bining shares of common stock with warrants. The sales force would rec-
ommend that purchasers of the "units" sell them back to First Jersey at a 
slight profit. Firstjersey would then split the stock from the warrants and 
sell these components separately to different customers through different 
branches for significantly more than the price at which it had repurchased 
the units. The effect was to charge an excessive markup to the purchasers 
of the unbundled unit components. 
The SEC sued not only Firstjersey but also Robert Brennan. Brennan 
was a director and the one hundred percent owner ofFirstJersey. He was 
at one time its president and later became its chairman and Chief Exec-
utive Officer. He "was intimately involved in the operations ofFirstJersey, 
including all significant decisions regarding the firm's underwriting, retail 
sales and trading activities." 167 The evidence at trial sufficed to show that 
he "had knowledge of First Jersey's frauds and participated in the fraud-
ulent scheme." 168 Pointing to findings that "Brennan was aware of and 
'was intimately involved in' the decisions as to unit-splitting and pricing, 
and that he orchestrated Firstjersey's balkanization ofits branches in order 
to keep customers in the dark," 169 the Second Circuit determined that: 
In light of the evidence presented at trial with regard to Brennan's 
hands-on involvement in the pertinent decisions, we conclude that 
the trial court did not err in finding that Brennan knowingly partici-
pated in Firstjersey's illegal activity and that he should be held pri-
marily liable for its violations of the securities laws. 110 
164. Id. at 175. 
165. I 0 I F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996). 
166. 155 F.3d I 07 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom., Romano v. SEC, 526 U.S. 1111 
(l 999). 
167. First]ersey Sec., Inc., IOI F.3d at 1460. 
168. Id. at 1471. 
169. Id. at 1472 (citation omitted). 
170. Id. 
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SEC v. US. Environmental, Inc. was a market manipulation case. The Sec-
ond Circuit reversed a dismissal and held that a trader who executed buy 
and sell orders by which the stock price was manipulated might be a 
primary violator. 17 1 The fact that this defendant was not the mastermind 
of the fraud made no difference, for Central Bank "never intended to restrict 
§ l O(b) liability to supervisors or directors of securities fraud schemes while 
excluding from liability subordinates who also violated the securities 
laws." 172 
First Jersey and US. Environmental suggest that the "bright line test" of 
Shapiro and Wright is not so bright after all. Although the manner in which 
the Second Circuit will ultimately resolve the apparent conflict between 
these decisions is yet unclear, two observations may improve prediction. 
First, US. Environmental was a straight manipulation case. Although First 
Jersey was not expressly so formulated, it, too, at bottom dealt with manip-
ulation. First Jersey itself created the price difference between the units it 
repurchased and the unbundled parts it sold because First Jersey domi-
nated both those markets. Indeed, the court found that First Jersey violated 
l 7(a) and lO(b) in part by failing to disclose "the nature of the market for 
[the] securities [and] the Firm's control over that market .... "17 3 In ad-
dition, at least by implication, FirstJersey "represented that the prices paid 
for [the J securities reflected their value in a competitive market. In fact, the 
market was created almost entirely by First Jersey's own activity .... " 174 
By its very nature, manipulation usually requires many purchases and 
sales. Each person who knowingly solicits or executes a trade contributing 
to the manipulation, and each person who coordinates the trades for a 
manipulative purpose, could be a primary violator. On the other hand, a 
misstatement is a single event, and it may be quite possible to track the 
misleading words to one author or speaker. Accordingly, the primary vi-
olators in a misstatement case may number far fewer than those in a 
manipulation case. 
Wright itself provides the second comment that may reconcile the Second 
Circuit's quartet of primary liability decisions. In the course of rejecting 
the view that a defendant who "substantially participates" in a misstate-
ment could be a primary violator, Wright observed that "[i]n First Jersey, 
we affirmed the imposition of primary liability under§ lO(b) on Robert 
Brennan, the president, chief executive and sole owner of First Jersey Se-
curities, Inc. Brennan had directed his employees to make false and misleading state-
ments to customers." 175 
In short, First Jersey and US. Environmental may mean nothing more in a 
misstatement case than that the individual who knowingly directs a sub-
171. See US. .Envtl., Inc., 155 F.3d at 111. 
172. Id. at 112. 
173. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d at 1467. 
174. Id. at 1468. 
175. Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 176 (2d Cir. l 998) (emphasis added). 
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ordinate to make a misstatement may be primarily liable along with the 
subordinate who actually and knowingly writes or speaks the defrauding 
words. If the defendant is a "secondary actor"-a term that the Second 
Circuit has not defined but which appears in a corporate misstatement 
case to mean those outside the corporation-then Wright imposes the ad-
ditional requirement that the statement be specifically and publicly attrib-
uted to that defendant. That is the reconciliation of the four Second Circuit 
primary liability decisions that seems most consistent with Central Bank. 
Underwriters are somewhat difficult to place in this analytical scheme. 
The court in In re MTC Electronic Technologies Shareholders Litigation originally 
granted an underwriter's motion to dismiss on the grounds that there was 
"no allegation that [the underwriter] made any of the allegedly fraudulent 
representations in [the] prospectus." 1 76 However, the court reversed itself 
on reconsideration, accepting the argument that the underwriters could 
be primarily liable because, "in light of the central role underwriters play 
in the issuance of securities and the special reliance placed on them by 
prospective investors, they are simply not secondary actors with respect to 
statements in a registration statement or prospectus." I 77 The court found 
that "the underwriter's role in a public offering is such that the represen-
tations in a registration statement or prospectus are its own," 178 and that 
"the statements in the ... prospectus must be deemed to be those of [the 
underwriter] as much as they are those of [the issuer]."179 
District court decisions in the Second Circuit, however, have frequently 
determined that outsiders other than underwriters are not primarily liable. 
A European bank's role in placing convertible notes did not subject it to 
primary liability, even though it distributed offering documents allegedly 
including misleading information, because the plaintiffs "did not allege 
that [the European bank] wrote any of the allegedly fraudulent material. 
Rather, they allege only that it disseminated the information to potential 
investors."18° A technical advisor to an issuer could be sued as a primary 
violator only after the plaintiffs alleged that other defendants made mis-
representations that those other defendants specifically attributed to the 
advisor. 1B1 An operating subsidiary was not a primary violator where plain-
176. In re MTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
177. In re MTC Elec. Techs. Shareholders Litig., 993 F. Supp. 160, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
178. Id. at 162. 
179. Id. at 162-63. 
IBO. Jn re College Bound Consol. Litig., Nos. 93Civ.2348 (MBM), 94Civ.3033 (MBM), 
1995 WL 450486, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.July 31, 1995) (granting motion to dismiss on 9(b) grounds 
and distinguishing bank's role from that of accounting firm held in on primary liability theory 
in In re Z<'.ZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994)). 
181. The court granted the advisor's motion to dismiss in part in Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. 
Natl#st Fin., Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 491, 508-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), commenting that: ''At most, 
the Amended Complaint alleges that [the advisor] knew that [others] would make misrep-
resentations to plaintiffs about [the advisor's] role in the [issuer's business]." Id. at 510. In a 
later opinion, the court held that a further amended complaint did allege a primary violation 
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tiffs alleged misrepresentations in a holding company's annual reports but 
did not allege that the subsidiary knowingly provided false information to 
the holding company that it then included in those reports.182 Accountants 
were not primarily liable for statements made by management that the ac-
countants had recommended certain internal controls for a business and 
that the accountants would oversee those internal controls and conduct 
annual audits.183 A bank that loaned money to a subsidiary of an issuer 
after the issuer signed an agreement to sell its stock but before the closing 
was not primarily liable for the issuer's false representation about the cash 
that it would have at closing, even though the loan created the falsity.184 
As these decisions show, plaintiffs should have some difficulty alleging 
primary liability against "secondary actors." Wright should make those 
difficulties particularly acute. Moreover, it is unclear whether pre- Wright 
decisions holding that those outside an issuer could be liable still survive. 185 
to the extent plaintiffs pied that, during a road show, other defendants made specific state-
ments that they attributed to the advisor. Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Fin., Inc., 122 F. 
Supp. 2d 407, 418-21 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In an unpublished decision, the Second Circuit re-
cently affirmed a judgment in favor of a public relations firm. Although one press release 
was printed on that firm's letterhead, "there was no evidence suggesting that anyone believed 
the press release represented a communication" by this outside consultant. \'Vinkler v. vVigley, 
[Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 91,278, at 95,5 73 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 2000). 
182. Sotheby's Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
ii 91,059, at 94,942-43 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2000) (granting a motion to dismiss and rejecting 
the argument that it was reasonable to infer the subsidiary endorsed the statements in the 
holding company's reports). 
183. See Pahmer v. Greenberg, 926 F. Supp. 287, 304-05 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting motion 
to dismiss). 
184. See Interallianz Bank AG v. Nycal Corp., [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ii 98,227, at 99,548, 99,552-53 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994) (granting motion to 
dismiss). Also, see Scone Investments, L.P. v. American Third Market Corp., [1998 Supp. Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 90,207, at 90,849 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1998), which granted 
a motion to dismiss by a bank that allegedly loaned money to one defendant so that the 
defendant could buy securities, pressured that defendant to sell the securities in order to bring 
down debt and "released" the securities for sale to one of the plaintiffs, who accepted transfer 
of the shares on the basis of a false statement that he would only need to hold them for a 
week because they had already been resold at a profit. 
[llhe Bank is alleged to have directed that the MKTB securities be sold, not that the 
sale be effectuated by way of fraudulent misrepresentation. 
**** 
Primary liability does not attach when the alleged fraudulent conduct is no more 
than the performance of a routine market function .... Here, the Bank's financing of 
the Rosehouse defendants' purchase of the MKTB securities and the release of its 
shares for trading amounts to nothing more than the routine functioning of a lending 
institution. 
Id. at 90,854 (citation omitted). See also V.H. Farey:Jones v. Buckingham, No. CV99-4205 
ADS, 2001 WL 178933, at *10-*1 I (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2001) (where one defendant allegedly 
made misrepresentations causing plaintiff to sell to a second defendant in a scheme to benefit 
the first and second defendants and a third besides, plaintiff stated no primary violation 
against defendants two and three). 
185. See, e.g., Werner v. Satterlee, Stephens, Burke & Burke, 797 F. Supp. 1196, 1207-09 
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Second Circuit trial courts are much more apt to find that those inside 
a corporation can be primarily liable. Audit committee members may be 
primary violators for misstatements in 10-Ks that they sign, as well as 
misrepresentations "that were directly authorized by the Board of Direc-
tors-for example, [representations] found in ... proxy statements."186 A 
COO may also be a primary violator for misrepresentations in an SEC 
filing that he signs.187 
Although district court decisions remain divided, some send primary 
liability deep into the executive ranks. In re MTG Electronics rejected in 
dictum the proposition "that a corporate insider must be personally re-
sponsible for a particular misstatement ... in order to be primarily liable 
. . . . "188 Three cases illustrate this view. 
In re Kidder Peabody Securities Litigation189 is probably the best known of 
these three. General Electric owned GE Capital Services, which in turn 
owned Kidder. Kidder employed a government securities trader named 
Orlandojosephjett.Jett recorded transactions which, though they had no 
economic significance, generated paper profits for Kidder. Kidder pro-
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (seeming to hold that a law firm could be primarily liable for statements 
made in a prospectus where the law firm acted as general corporate counsel to the issuer, 
assisted in sham transactions and then assisted the issuer in preparing the registration state-
ment and prospectus that omitted key facts about the transactions); In re Union Carbide 
Corp. Consumer Prods. Bus. Sec. Litig., 676 F. Supp. 458, 466-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying 
motion to dismiss by investment bankers who supplied projected sale price for business units 
that issuer included in public documents and holding, "[p] reparation of misleading projec-
tions or provision of the raw data for such projections can constitute direct participation in 
a misrepresentation, and lead to primary lOb-5 liability .... "). It is unclear from both opin-
ions to what extent the misleading documents specifically attributed statements in them to 
the law firm or the investment bankers. 
186. Jn reJWP Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying summary 
judgment on l 0-Ks and proxy statements). On the other hand, the committee members were 
not primarily liable for "press releases issued by ... management or other statements that 
were not expressly authorized by the Board of Directors." Id. (granting summary judgment 
on press releases because audit committee members were entitled to judgment "to the extent 
that [plaintiffs'] claims are based on alleged misrepresentations that the audit committee 
defendants did not make."). In an unpublished decision, the Second Circuit affirmed a judg-
ment in favor of an outside director where plaintiff alleged that part of an annual report 
misled and where the director's signature was limited to other parts of the report. Winkler 
v. Wigley, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'If 91,278, at 95,573 (2d Cir. Dec. 6, 
2000) ("[The director] did sign a financial statement contained in the report, but ... this 
statement concerned 1979 and 1980, the years before [the transaction about which the report 
allegedly omitted material facts]."). 
187. See Thomson Kernaghan & Co. v. Global lntellicom, Inc., Nos. 99Civ.3005 (DLC), 
99Civ.3015 (DLC), 2000 WL 640653, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2000) (finding the COO's 
"filing of allegedly false and misleading documents with the SEC which misrepresented 
Global's financial condition cannot be dismissed as 'merely preparatory to the fraud,' but 
rather represent misrepresentations upon which plaintiffs' securities fraud claim may be 
premised") (citation omitted). 
188. In reMTC Elec. Tech. Shareholders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 980 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 
189. 10 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y 1998). 
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vided its financial data to GE Capital Services on a quarterly basis, and 
"that data was incorporated in [GE Capital Services'] financial statements 
and GE's quarterly and annual reports." 190 After GE disclosed the false 
profits and took a one-time charge to correct its books, its stock price fell. 
Shareholders sued not only General Electric, but also Kidder and four 
individuals: (i) Kidder's Board Chairman and CEO; (ii) Kidder's Chief 
Financial and Administrative Officer, whose responsibilities included over-
seeing Kidder's operations and its audit and credit functions; (iii) the head 
of the Fixed Income Division in which Jett worked; and (iv) Jett himsel£ 
In holding that such defendants might be primarily liable for financial 
statements published by General Electric, the court wrote that Central 
Bank's requirement for a defendant to "make a misrepresentation does not 
mean that the defendant must communicate that misrepresentation di-
rectly to the plaintiff."191 Instead, 
where the defendant has made a misstatement but used another actor 
to deliver the message, the defendant still may be liable as a primary 
violator .... 
[I]f plaintiffs can show that defendants were the original and 
knowing source of the misrepresentation and that defendants knew 
or should have known that misrepresentation would be communi-
cated to investors, primary liability should attach. 192 
In denying summary judgment to the head of the Fixed Income Divi-
sion, the court specifically held that he might be a primary violator even 
though he "was not the actual speaker for any of the alleged misstate-
ments." 193 "[A] reasonable trier of fact could conclude that [he] was know-
ingly and inextricably involved in generating the false profits that led to 
the misstatements."194 
In re The Leslie Fay Companies, Inc. Securities Litigation195 is the second case 
addressing primary liability of officers who do not themselves "make"a 
statement. It held that division presidents might be primarily liable for 
submitting material financial misstatements from their divisions to be in-
corporated into Leslie Fay's consolidated financial results. 196 At least two 
of the division presidents argued that "they were not spokesmen for the 
Company and did not control corporate policy or communications to 
shareholders or the investing public[,]" and all argued that they "did not 
190. Id. at 407. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. (citations omitted). 
193. Id. at 419. 
194. Id. 
195. 918 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y 1996). Note that this case pre-dates Shapiro and Wright. 
196. Id. at 761-62. 
1044 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 56, May 200 I 
draft, issue or sign any of the Company's public financial documents." 197 
The court nevertheless denied their motion to dismiss and found "[t]he 
fact that the Division Presidents were not responsible for consolidating and 
gathering the financials, and did not sign any of the public documents does 
not absolve them of liability." 198 
In re Health Management, lnc. 199 is the third case suggesting that "non-
speaking" officers may be primary violators under Second Circuit law. In 
Health Management, the court denied a motion for more definite statement 
filed by defendants Myers and Hirsh.200 Myers and Hirsh had allegedly 
participated in a scheme to include fictitious "in transit" inventory in 
Health Management's balance sheet, which decreased its cost of goods 
sold and thereby inflated its earnings. At the time they took the actions 
asserted in the complaint, Myers and Hirsh were vice presidents of Health 
Management's Pennsylvania subsidiary. Plaintiffs alleged that Myers had 
attended a meeting at which executives devised the scheme, and that Hirsh 
had created one false inventory form and directed another employee to 
create a second phony form. The court held that "plaintiffs have alleged 
facts implicating Hirsh and Myers in the 'in-transit' inventory portion of 
the overall fraudulent scheme to impart to the investment community an 
artificial earnings statement."201 Expressly relying on First Jersey, the court 
ruled that "plaintiffs need not allege that Hirsch and Myers made any 
fraudulent statements during the Class Period. "202 
Copland v. Grumet203 stands opposed to Kidder, Leslie Fay, and Health Man-
agement and is much more in tune with Central Bank,s instruction that those 
who only aid and abet a misstatement cannot be liable for it in a private 
1 Ob-5 action. The Copland plaintiffs alleged that two officers cooked the 
books of a subsidiary and that the subsidiary's financial figures were then 
incorporated into the issuer's public financials. The court found no claim 
stated against the subsidiary officers for primarily liability on the misstate-
ments in the parent company's reports.2°4 "[T]here were no 'statements' 
which were attributed to them in the public documents at issue."20S This 
reasoning seems to treat executives like the accountants in Wright and to 
197. Id.at761. 
198. Id. at 762. 
199. 970 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.N.Y 1997). 
200. Id. at 209-10. This case also pre-dates Shapiro and Wright. 
20 I. Id. at 209. 
202. Id. 
203. 88 F. Supp. 2d 326, 332 (D.N.J. 1999) (relying expressly on Shapiro and Wright, al-
though sitting in the Third Circuit, and concluding that Wright "has added a new consider-
ation, namely that in order to hold an individual liable for material misstatements, the mis-
representations must have been attributable to that specific actor at the time of public 
dissemination"). 
204. Id. at 332-33. 
205. Id. at 332 n.9. 
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require attribution of statements to the executives individually for them to 
be primary violators. 
However the Second Circuit resolves the ambiguity created by these 
decisions, it is certain that that circuit's "group pleading" cases are wildly 
out of tune with that court of appeals' definition of primary liability. At a 
semantic level, the phrase "insiders and affiliates" is not anywhere near a 
close description of defendants who actually make a misstatement or to 
whom a misstatement is publicly and specifically attributed. Even if pri-
mary liability reaches those who order a misstatement as well as those who 
make it (as Wright interprets First Jersey), even if primary liability bores down 
inside a corporation to the persons who (in Kidder's words) were the "origi-
nal and knowing source of the misrepresentation,'' or even if primary 
liability reaches (as Health Management and Leslie Fay imply) those who take 
the actions in a corporation that ultimately cause it to make a material 
misrepresentation, the circle of primary violators is much smaller than 
those encompassed by the word "insiders." The word "affiliates" is simi-
larly unfocused. In no way does it point to those who actually wrote or 
spoke misleading words or those outside a corporation to whom specific 
statements are publicly linked. Instead of being a good predictor of who 
will ultimately be found primarily liable after discovery, the Second Cir-
cuit's definition of who can be "group pleaded" into a case seems to invite 
naming defendants who are not primary violators. 
Aside from the linguistic disconnection, the actual holdings under the 
two tests do not match. For example, "insiders and affiliates" can include 
a corporate secretary,2°6 even though that position may be largely minis-
terial and the secretary so far removed from a statement that he or she 
could not be a primary violator under Second Circuit law. The sometime 
application of Second Circuit "group pleading" law to oral statements and 
to writings signed by an identified individual2°7 is similarly out of sync with 
the primary liability opinions of that court of appeals. It certainly can be 
the case that a group creates the text of a speech or analyst presentation 
given by one executive, and documents signed by a single officer can be 
written by committee. An oral statement or a document signed by one 
individual, however, can also be created by the speaker or sole signatory 
alone. The probability that others were sufficiently involved to be primarily 
liable under Second Circuit holdings is not so high that a court should 
presume such involvement. Even if an oral statement or a writing attrib-
uted to a single author is a group production, the odds are small that a 
court can, at the outset of a case and without discovery, use the Luce "in-
siders or affiliates" formulation to correctly identify those-other than the 
speaker or author-who are likely responsible for the statement under 
206. See supra note I 04 and accompanying text. 
207. See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text. 
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Shapiro or Wright or even under First Jersey, Kidder, Health Management, and 
Leslie Fay. 
Given the vast difference between its "group pleading" rules and its 
definition of primary liability, the Second Circuit would do well to discard 
the group rules altogether. If not, this circuit must undertake a major 
overhaul to conform the Luce exception to its post-Central Bank decisions. 
THE EFFECT OF THE PRIVATE SECURITIES 
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 
As necessary as they would otherwise be, efforts to conform "group 
pleading" to definitions of primary liability may be moot. The PSLRA 
may ultimately end "group pleading" in all its forms. 
In private actions under section lO(b) of the 1934 Act, the PSLRA 
requires that plaintiffs plead "with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind," which 
is scienter in a 1 O(b) case; demands that complaints "specify each statement 
alleged to have been misleading [and] ... the reasons why the statement 
is misleading;" and imposes a stay of discovery until the trial court decides 
motions to dismiss. 20s 
The PSLRA's command that plaintiffs plead scienter with particularity 
should end the erroneous reliance that some courts have placed on "group 
pleading" to satisfy that element of a lO(b) case.2°9 The more important 
question, however, is whether the PSLRA ends "group pleading" alto-
gether. The lower courts are split on this issue.210 
208. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The requirement for specific scienter 
pleading is codified at subsection (b)(2), the requirement that each misleading statement be 
specified at subsection (b)(l), and the discovery stay at subsection (b)(3)(B). Courts have in-
terpreted the new scienter pleading rule differently, and this Article will not review those 
opinions. The PSLRA contained many other provisions besides the three mentioned in the 
text (e.g., replacing joint and several liability with proportionate liability for many defendants, 
defining a procedure for choosing and the substantive standard for selecting the lead plaintiff 
in lO(b) class actions, establishing a formula capping lO(b) damages and creating a "safe 
harbor" for "forward-looking statements"). 
209. Chu v. Sabratek Corp., 100 F. Supp. 2d 827 (N.D. Ill. 2000), confuses "group pleading" 
with "how each individual defendant was supposed to know that the statements ... were 
false," but correctly concludes that the PSLRA means that "[t)o the extent the plaintiffs 
plead scienter based exclusively on an individual defendant's position in [the company's] 
hierarchy, their claims must be dismissed." Id. at 836-37. 
210. Cases holding that "group pleading" does not survive the PSLRA: In re Premier 
Techs. Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 91,293, at 95,654 (N.D. 
Ga. Dec. 8, 2000); In re Ciena Corp. Sec. Litig., 99 F. Supp. 2d 650, 663 n.11 (D. Md. 2000) 
(remarking, though not deciding the question, "that application of [group pleading] doctrine 
to nonspeaking defendants would seem to be inconsistent with the strict pleading require-
ments of the [PSLRA] "); Zishka v. American Pad & Paper Co., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 91,208, at 95,044 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2000); In re Ashworth, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., [Current Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 91,243, at 95,287 n.3 (S.D. Cal.July 18, 
2000) (stating in the footnote that while the group pleading doctrine did not apply, "there 
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Opinions ruling that the PSLRA forecloses "group pleading" divide into 
three categories. The first set points to the Act's requirement that plaintiffs 
plead each defendant's scienter individually and reasons that it would 
make little sense to demand such particularized allegations of each def en-
may be circumstances where it would be appropriate to attribute statements to a group of 
defendants, such as where a corporation's officers and directors are few in number and make 
corporate decisions on a group basis."); In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 91,245, at 91,303 (S.D. Cal.July 11, 2000) (same); Calliott v. HFS, 
Inc., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 90,939, at 94,030-31 (N.D. Tex. 
Mar. 31, 2000); Branca v. Paymantech, Inc., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
ii 90,911, at 93,850 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2000); Marra v. Tel-Save Holdings, Inc., [2000 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 90,480, at 92,288 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 1999); In re Home 
Health Corp. of Am., Inc. Sec. Litig., [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
ii 90,414, at 91,877 (E.D. Pa.Jan. 29, 1999); Coates v. Heartland Wireless Communications, 
Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 910, 915-16 (N. D. Tex. 1998); Allison v. Brooktree Corp., 999 F. Supp. 
1342, 1350 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 
Cases holding that group pleading survives the PSLRA include: In re SmarTalk Teleser-
vices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 527, 545 (S.D. Ohio 2000); In re Splash Tech. Holdings, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 91,249, at 95,351-52 n.13 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 29, 2000) (noting that although the "cases finding tension between the group-
pleading doctrine and the [PSLRA] are more persuasively reasoned, the Court assumes for 
purposes of its analysis that the group published information doctrine survives the [Act]"); 
Stanley v. Safeskin Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 91,221, at 95, 145 
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2000); In re USA Talks.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ii 91,231, at 95,235 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2000) (seeming to employ group 
pleading after noting that Ninth Circuit has not addressed the effect of the PSLRA); In re 
Solv-Ex Corp. Sec. Litig., 96Civ.7575 (RMB), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13113, at *15 (S.D.N.Y 
Sept. 6, 2000); In re Hi/fn, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C99-453 I SI, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11631, 
at *36-37 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2000) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has not reached the PSLRA's 
effect on group pleading, but then finding that the doctrine would not save the relevant 
plaintiffs' allegations anyway); Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ii 91,258, at 95,410 n.5 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2000) (stating, unclearly, that, 
"[a]lthough some of the defendants argue that after the [PSLRA], the 'group pleading doc-
trine' can no longer be used, the Eleventh Circuit has not specifically addressed the issue 
and at least one district court in the circuit has assumed the doctrine's continued viability. 
Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that each of the individual defendants, due to their high 
ranking positions at Cyberguard were involved in controlling the content of the information 
released by Cyberguard.") (citations omitted); In re System Software Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 
[2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ii 90,910, at 93,84 7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2000) 
("Without deciding the issue, this court adopts the group publication theory-to the extent 
that any inferences mentioned above may seem to rely on that theory-for purposes of this 
opinion only."); In re AgriBioTech Sec. Litig., [1999-2000 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
ii 90,771, at 93,757 (D. Nev. Mar. 2, 2000); In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., 105 F. Supp. 
2d 1342, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2000); In re The Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 
2000); In re Secure Computing Corp. Sec. Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 810, 821 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
(granting motion to dismiss but apparently in this part of the opinion giving guidance to 
plaintiffs for repleading); In re American Bank Note Holographies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 93 F. Supp. 
2d 424, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 976, 988 
(E.D. Mo. 1999); In re Livent, Inc. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 194, 219 (S.D.N.Y 1999); In re 
Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1340-41 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Danis v. USN Com-
munications, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 923, 939 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (appearing to conclude that 
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dant's state of mind while permitting some defendants' connection with 
the misstatements to be pled by "group" allegations. Coates v. Heartland 
Wireless Communications, Inc.211 provides perhaps the best statement of this 
position: 
a plaintiff must state with particularity the facts that give rise to a 
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of 
mind. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). This requirement is fairly interpreted 
to require that a plaintiff allege facts regarding scienter as to each 
defendant. So interpreted, [this section] is consistent with the 
[PSLRA's] policy of protecting defendants from unwarranted fraud 
claims and strike suits. It is nonsensical to require that a plaintiff 
specifically allege facts regarding scienter as to each defendant, but 
to allow him to rely on group pleading in asserting that the defendant 
made the statement or omission. 2 12 
Some courts respond that this view conflates two different 1 Ob-5 ele-
ments. One element is that the defendant make the challenged statement. 
The defendant's state of mind is a separate element. As the court in In re 
BankAmerica Corp. Securities Litigation2 I 3 stated " [ c] ases holding that group 
group pleading continues after the PSLRA until the Seventh Circuit holds otherwise); In re 
Oxford Health Plans, Inc., Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 133, 142 (S.D.N.Y 1999); In re PETsMART, 
Inc., Sec. Litig., 61 F. Supp. 2d 982, 997 (D. Ariz. 1999) (stating in a confused discussion 
that the court "do [es] not dispute plaintiffs contention that the doctrine survives the 
[PSLRA]" but doing so in the context of applying the "opportunity" prong of the "motive 
and opportunity" test for evaluating scienter allegations); In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., 34 F. 
Supp. 2d 935, 949 n. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (failing to decide the question but remarking that 
"[a]lthough it is unclear whether the group pleading doctrine survives under the [PSLRA], 
the Court will assume for the purposes of this Motion that the ... doctrine is still viable."); 
Copperstone v. TCSI Corp., No. C97-3495 SBA, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20978, at *52-*54 
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (noting the defense argument that the PSLRA abolishes group pleading, 
then proceeding to hold that plaintiffs had not pleaded sufficient facts to take advantage of 
the doctrine anyway); Schlagel v. Learning Tree Int'!, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ~ 90,403, at 91,815 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1998); Schaffer v. Evolving Sys., Inc., 
29 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1225 (D. Colo. 1998); In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., I F. Supp. 
2d 1096, 1108 (D. Nev. 1998); Genna v. Digital Link Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1044 (N.D. 
Cal. 1997) (commenting, apparently as dicta, "[d)efendants claim that only defendants who 
actually made statements can be held liable because the PSLRA abolishes group pleading 
.... [T]here is a potential for liability if the allegedly false or misleading statements are 
shown to be the collective actions of the defendant officers. However, because plaintiff has 
not met his burden of pleading false and misleading statements, the court does not determine 
at this time whether any individual defendant should be dismissed with prejudice."). This 
note does not include post-PSLRA cases that employ group pleading without discussing 
whether the PSLRA makes reliance on such pleading wrong. 
211. 26 F. Supp. 2d 910 (N.D. Tex. 1998). 
212. Id. at 916. See Branca v. Paymentech, Inc., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 90,911, at 93,850 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2000) (following Coates v. Heartland Wireless 
Communications, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634 (N.D. Tex. 1999)). 
213. 78 F. Supp. 2d 976 (E.D. Mo. 1999). 
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pleading is no longer available ... state that because the [PSLRA] requires 
that ... scienter be pled with regard to each act or omission, the group 
pleading doctrine was overruled sub silentio by the Act. However, the [group 
pleading] doctrine has nothing to do with scienter. "214 
A second set of decisions holding that the PSLRA ends "group plead-
ing" relies not only on the Act's requirement for specific scienter allega-
tions but also on the Act's command that a plaintiff specifically identify 
misstatements or omissions. Allison v. Brooktree Corp.2 15 reasons: 
[T] he continued vitality of the judicially created group-published doc-
trine is suspect since the [PSLRA] specifically requires that the untrue state-
ments or omissions be set forth with particularity as to 'the defendant' and that 
scienter be plead in regards to 'each act or omission' sufficient to give 
'rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required 
state of mind.'2 16 
More important, however, than the ambiguity as to which defendants 
are sued on which statements-a matter that plaintiffs might seek to address 
by conclusory pleading that defendants A, B, and C were all in a group 
responsible for statements l and 2-is the failure to allege particular facts 
to show that each of the defendants actually drafted or spoke the offending 
words. Ultimately, that is the fundamental failure of group pleading. 
A third group of cases simply states that "group pleading" is inconsistent 
with the Act's overall emphasis on factually specific allegations.2 17 This 
view has considerable force, as "group pleading" was created by judges 
214. Id. at 988 (citations omitted). 
215. 999 F. Supp. 1342 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 
216. Id. at 1350 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Other courts have questioned the 
doctrine's continuing vitality on this same reasoning. See In re Premier Techs. Inc. Sec. Litig., 
[Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'I! 91,243, at 95,654 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 8, 2000); In 
re Ashworth, Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 91,243, at 95,287 
(S.D. Cal.July 18, 2000); In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 91,245, at 95,303 (S.D. Cal.July 11, 2000); Calliott v. HFS, Inc., [2000 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'IJ 90,939, at 94,032 n.3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2000) (following 
Marra, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'I! 90,480); Marra v. Tel-Save Holdings, Inc., 
[1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'll 90,480, at 92,288 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 1999). 
217. See In re Ciena Corp. Sec. Litig., 99 F. Supp. 2d 650, 663 n.11 (D. Md. 2000) (stating 
that the "application of that doctrine to non-speaking defendants would seem to be incon-
sistent with the strict pleading requirements of the [PSLRA]."); Zishka v. American Pad & 
Paper Co., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'll 91,208, at 95,044 (N.D. Tex. Sept, 13, 2000) 
(rejecting "the notion of'group pleading,' and 'group publication' and conclud[ing] that such 
concepts, if previously sustainable, did not survive the adoption of [PSLRAJ. To comply with 
the [Act], Plaintiffs thus must plead with particularity their allegations against each individual 
Defendant.") (citation omitted); In re Home Health Corp. of Am., Inc. Sec. Litig., [1999 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'IJ 90,414, at 91,877 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1999) (agreeing 
"that the group published information doctrine is inconsistent with the [PSLRA's] pleading 
requirements"). 
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and favors plaintiffs by permitting them to name defendants without spe-
cifically alleging facts against them to support a required element of the 
case. This does seem contrary to the whole thrust of the PSLRA. 
One rejoining argument is that the PSLRA was itself a specific piece 
of legislation, that Congress targeted the changes it chose to make and 
that courts should not infer that Congress intended to make others. Be-
cause Congress did not insert a requirement that plaintiffs plead particular 
facts to connect each defendant to misrepresentations or omissions, none 
should be judicially added simply because courts conclude that such a 
change logically compliments the pleading reforms that Congress 
introduced. 
The rebuttal, however, is that Congress through the PSLRA deliberately 
drove the courts towards specific pleading. It expressly required specific 
scienter pleading and specific allegations to identify which statements 
plaintiffs contend to be misleading and why they were misleading. It is 
hubris for the courts to conclude that, just because Congress did not also 
single out group pleading for abolition, the bench should retain a judge-
made generality which is so out of step with the legislature's unmistakable 
signal that only specificity will prevent abuse. 
Although the cases finding that the PSLRA abolishes "group pleading" 
have weight, the opinions that seem to support group pleading's survival 
after the Act are far less persuasive. Some say nothing more than that the 
court assumes the continued existence of the protocol only for purposes 
of the one decision containing the comment.2 18 Others say little more than 
that they continue to apply "group pleading" because the courts of appeals 
in their circuits have not yet held that they should stop.219 Some, like In re 
218. See In re Splash Tech. Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
'1] 91,249, at 95,351-52 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2000) (see quotation in note 210 supra); In re 
Systems Software Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. '1] 90,910, 
at 93,84 7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2000) (noting also that the Seventh Circuit has not decided the 
question and that two cases in the district and one outside the district had employed group 
pleading after the PSLRA: Koehler v. NationsBank Corp., No. 96C2050, 1997 WL 80928 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 1997) (but not addressing whether PSLRA ends "group pleading"); Powers 
v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031, 1040-41 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (same); In re Discovery Zone Sec. 
Litig., 943 F. Supp. 924, 937-38 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (same)); In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., 34 F. 
Supp. 2d 935, 949 n. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (noting, "[a]lthough it is unclear whether the group 
pleading doctrine survives under the [PSLRA], the Court will assume for the purposes of 
this Motion that the ... doctrine is still viable."). 
219. See Stanley v. Safeskin Corp., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'IJ 91,221, 95, 145 
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 1999) (noting that the In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 
746 (N.D. Cal. 1997), decision had employed group pleading in a PSLRA case and stating, 
"[t]he Court is unaware of any Ninth Circuit decision, to date, that has rejected the group 
pleading presumption"); In re USA Talks.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. 'IJ 91,231, at 95,235 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2000) (noting that the "Ninth Circuit has not 
specifically addressed whether the heightened pleading standard for securities fraud cases, 
imposed by the [PSLRA], has eliminated the 'group pleading' or 'group published' doc-
trine"); In re Hi/fn, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C99-453 l SI, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11631, at *36 
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BankAmerica Corp. in the passage set out above, argue that the PSLRA 
changed other pleading rules but did not specifically abrogate "group 
pleading" and that courts should not infer that Congress sought to end 
the group rule.22° "Group pleading" itself, however, was never based on 
any statute. Accordingly, it may be quite appropriate for courts to recon-
sider this judicially created rule if it appears-as it does-to be contrary 
to the overall approach that Congress took. 
A few opinions justify the use of the pleading protocol by pointing to 
post-PSLRA decisions that employ "group pleading" without discussing 
the Act's effect on such allegations. 221 The cases on which these opinions, 
however, rely cannot constitute authority on a point they do not even 
address. 
One decision preserves "group pleading" on the basis that it creates 
only a "rebuttable presumption"222 and another on the basis that it creates 
a "reasonable presumption."223 This, however, avoids the question, which 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2000) (stating that "the Ninth Circuit has not addressed this issue" and 
citing to In re Secure Computing Corp. Sec. Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 810 (N.D. Cal. 2000), as 
a decision that "upheld the doctrine's continued application."); Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp., 
[Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ii 91,258, at 95,410 n.5 (S.D. Fla. July 31, 2000) (stating 
that "the Eleventh Circuit has not specifically addressed the issue and at least one district 
court in the circuit has assumed the doctrine's continued viability"); In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., 
89 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 1999) ("Although the Court recognizes that some courts 
have questioned the continuing vitality of the group pleading doctrine, we find that the 
rationale behind the group pleading doctrine sound and will not disturb it absent direction 
from the Eleventh Circuit. The Court notes that this conclusion is consistent with both the 
language of the PSLRA, and the overwhelming majority of courts to consider the matter."); 
Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 923, 939 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1999) ("Until 
receiving clarification from the Seventh Circuit, this court is unwilling to read the [PSLRA] 
as abolishing all remnants of notice pleading and the liberal standards under which motions 
to dismiss are viewed."); Schlagel v. Learning Tree Int'!, [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ii 90,403, at 91,815-16 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1998) (''Although the Court recog-
nizes that some courts have questioned the continuing vitality of the group-pleading doctrine 
... , the questioning occurred in the context of attributing liability to seemingly unrelated 
executive employees. Until the Ninth Circuit speaks otherwise, the Court finds the rationale 
behind the group-pleading doctrine sound and will not disturb it."). 
220. See quotation in text at note 214, supra. In In re Strastosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., I F. Supp. 
2d I 096 (D. Nev. 1998), the court held, "[d]efendants offer no case authority for their prop-
osition that group pleading has been sub silentio abolished by the [PSLRA], and this Court 
declines to adopt such a proposition." Id. at 1 I 08. The court also noted and relied on a 
district court decision, In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746, 759 (N.D. Cal. 
1997), which employed group pleading in a case governed by the PSLRA but did not discuss 
any argument that the Act abrogated such pleading. Id. See also In re American Bank Note 
Holographies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 424, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("It is well settled 
that plaintiffs may engage in so-called group-pleading under IO(b) and Rule lOb-5; nothing 
in the [PSLRA] has altered that doctrine."). 
221. See supra note 220 (citing Strastosphere references to the Silicon Graphics decision). See 
also supra note 218 (citing In re System Sefiware Assocs., Inc. references to the Discovery :(one and 
Koehler cases). 
222. In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., l 05 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 2000). 
223. Jn re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 976, 988 (E.D. Mo. 1999). 
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is whether such a pleading "presumption" should be tolerated at all, given 
the Act's several requirements for specific factual allegations. One case 
analyzes the Tenth Circuit's pre-PSLRA scienter pleading rules, reasons 
that those rules track PSLRA requirements, and then concludes that the 
Tenth Circuit's pre-PSLRA "group pleading" authority must also survive 
the Act.224 But this is a non sequitur, as "group pleading" does not address 
scienter but instead each defendant's connection to misstatements or 
omissions. 
A few opinions endorse post-PSLRA "group pleading" without any 
reasoning at all.225 The remaining cases supporting such pleading rely on 
the other opinions summarized above. 226 
With the arguments that the pleading protocol survives the Act quite 
weak and those holding that the Act abolishes "group pleading" not yet 
universally accepted, the debate remains open. That debate, however, 
should consider one further point. The purpose of "group pleading" is to 
permit plaintiffs to name as defendants those who are likely to have had 
a sufficient hand in the offending statements so that they could be primary 
violators but who cannot be tied to the statements by specific facts without discovery.227 
224. See Schaffer v. Evolving Sys., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1225 n.5 (D. Colo. 1998). 
225. See In re PETsMART, Inc. Sec. Litig., 61 F. Supp. 2d 982, 997 (D. Ariz. 1999); 
Copperstone v. TCSI Corp. No. C973495 SBA, 1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 20978, at *52-*54 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 1999); Genna v. Digital Link Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1044 (N.D. 
Cal. 1997). 
226. See In reSolv-Ex Corp. Sec. Litig., 96Civ.7575 (RMB), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13113, 
at* 15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000); In re The Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 
2000); In re SmarTalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 527, 545 (S.D. Ohio 
2000); In re Secure Computing Corp. Sec. Litig. 120 F. Supp. 2d 810, 821 (N.D. Cal. 2000); 
In re AgriBioTech Sec. Litig., [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '\[ 90, 771, 
at 93,757 (D. Nev. Mar. 2, 2000); In re Livent, Inc. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 194, 219 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 133, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
227. See, for example, In re Reliance Sec. Litig., 91 F. Supp. 2d 706 (D. Del. 2000), where 
the court responded to defense argument "that the act of signing, or participating in the 
preparation of, group-published documents does not amount to a misstatement or omission." 
Id. at 720-21. The court reasoned: 
[p]laintiffs have not yet had the opportunity to take discovery to determine the role that 
these defendants played in the Company, and the extent to which they were knowl-
edgeable of the alleged inadequacy of the Company's loan loss reserves. In light of these 
defendants' membership on the Company's Audit Committee, Financial Oversight 
Committee, or Executive Committee, the court will permit plaintiffs to conduct discov-
ery to determine whether these defendants made actionable misstatements or omissions. 
Id. See also Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 923, 939 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1999) 
(answering defense arguments about group pleading and outside directors: "The exact extent 
of each of the individual defendant's role and duties within USN, and their corresponding 
knowledge, cannot be ascertained until after discovery. Plaintiffs' recovery against any par-
ticular defendant will depend on actual proof tying that defendant to a material misrepre-
sentation."); In re Alliance Pharm. Sec. Litig., Nos. 92-1380-IEG (AJB), 92-1445, 1995 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 11351, at *37 n.14 (noting the group publishing doctrine "is justified by the 
need to allow plaintiffs discovery before they can pin down which directors and officers were 
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That rationale for the protocol is completely at odds with the discovery 
stay that the PSLRA imposes at the outset of a case while defendants test 
the factual allegations of a complaint with motions to dismiss. 22s That stay 
is designed to stop "sue first and ask questions later" tactics. As the Ninth 
Circuit stated: "Congress clearly intended that complaints in these secu-
rities actions should stand or fall based on the actual knowledge of the 
plaintiffs rather than information produced by the defendants after the 
action has been filed. "229 This reasoning for the stay is unreservedly hostile 
to the notion of "group pleading," which is precisely that plaintiffs should 
be able to name defendants without having "actual knowledge" that those 
defendants made the statements that plaintiffs claim are wrong. 
WHETHER THE PLEADING PROTOCOL MAKES SENSE 
Putting to one side the effect of such recent developments such as Central 
Bank and the PSLRA, there is a more fundamental question: Does "group 
pleading" make sense? Put another way: Is the title that a defendant holds 
a reliable indicator that he or she is presumptively likely to have written 
or contributed to a particular false statement in a corporate disclosure? 
actually involved in certain corporate actions."); In re AnnTaylor Stores Sec. Litig., 807 F. 
Supp. 990, 1004-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating, "[p]rior to discovery, plaintiffs are not expected 
to pinpoint precisely who uttered the statements ... [, and endorsing that,] 'a plaintiff may 
not be able to plead the precise role of each defendant when a group of defendants has acted 
in concert .... Under those circumstances, it is appropriate to plead the actions of the group 
and leave development of individual liability questions until some discovery has been under-
taken, rather than to dismiss the plaintiff because he does not have what may be concealed 
information.'") (citingJackson v. First Fed. Sav. F.A., 709 F. Supp. 863, 878 (E.D. Ark. 1988); 
Wegbreit v. Marley Orchards Corp., 793 F. Supp. 95 7, 962 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (discussing 
RICO claim and dismissing for other reasons, citing Wool and reasoning so: "[c]onsidering 
that no discovery has occurred, the plaintiffs' statement of the defendants' respective roles is 
adequate."), case reinstated under Exchange Act section 27A, 793 F. Supp. 965 (E.D. Wash. 
1992); Nicholas v. Poughkeepsie Savings Bank/FSB, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 95,606, at 97,842 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1990) ("It would be virtually impos-
sible before there had been any discovery for the plaintiffs to delineate which defendants 
were responsible for which acts. It is sufficient in the Court's view for the plaintiff to allege 
the positions held by the defendants and charge them collectively rather than specify their 
individual conduct."). 
228. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
229. Medhekar v. U.S. District Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 99 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 
1996) (holding that the discovery stay in the PSLRA applies to initial disclosures under Rule 
26(a) and related local rules); SG Cowen Sec. Corp. v. U.S. District Court for the N. Dist. of 
Cal., 189 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Medhekar, 99 F.3d at 328, while finding that 
a district court erred in permitting limited discovery to learn, among other things, the rela-
tionship between the issuer defendant and an investment banking/brokerage house defendant 
employing an analyst following the issuer). But see Vacold LLC v. Cerami, No. OOCIV.4024 
(AGS), 2001WL167704, at *6-*7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2001) (granting plaintiff relief from stay 
in order to conduct limited merits discovery; recognizing that its holding is contrary to SG 
Cowen). 
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Both the Ninth and the Second Circuits adopted "group pleading" 
without empirical evidence before them. Plaintiffs' briefs in J#Jol and Luce 
were devoid of citations to studies showing such a strong pattern of par-
ticipation in corporate disclosures by individuals or entities occupying cer-
tain positions that courts could properly presume involvement by such 
potential defendants in certain types of communications.230 It is not clear 
that the world reflects such a pattern. 
Consider the financial statements that an issuer publishes in a press 
release each quarter. The degree to which the CEO is involved in creating 
the release may vary. If the release purports to quote the CEO, it may be 
fair that he or she be held accountable for that quotation. It is unrealistic 
to presume, however, that the CEO created the numbers in the release. The 
CEO may have played a key role, even becoming involved in revenue 
recognition decisions on large transactions that could mean the difference 
between meeting analyst estimates or not. On the other hand, the CEO 
may have had virtually no involvement in revenue recognition decisions 
or other accounting matters, leaving all of that to the finance staff. 23 1 The 
probability that the CEO was so involved in the creation of a specific false 
number so that the CEO could be primarily liable for that number is not 
high enough to justify a presumption. 
This problem with the presumption underlying "group pleading" grows 
larger when courts apply group analysis to long documents such as a 10-K. 
Although it may be safe to presume that such documents are the product 
of collective effort, it is also likely that different individuals write different 
sections. Thus, the COO or someone on the COO's staff may have prin-
cipal or complete drafting responsibility for a paragraph in the MD&A on 
an operational issue. On the other hand, the COO may have nothing to 
do with drafting the section devoted to liquidity. It makes no common 
sense to include the COO as a "group" defendant in a case based on an 
alleged misrepresentation regarding liquidity simply because the COO or 
a member of the COO's staff was a part ofa team that drafted the 10-K. 
CONCLUSION 
If the courts keep "group pleading" at all, then in light of Central Bank 
and each circuit's definition of primary liability (i) at least some of the 
230. See the discussion of "group pleading" in: Opening Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., (9th Cir.July 7, 1986) (No. 85-2674), 33-34 (on file with 
The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law). Also see the discussions of"group 
pleading" in: Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief, Luce v. Edelstein, (2d Cir. March 28, 1986) (No. 
86-7120) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law); Reply 
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Luce v. Edelstein, 2-4 (2d Cir. May 5, l 986) (No. 86-7 l 20) (on 
file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law). 
231. Whether the CEO should be liable on the basis of signing an SEC filing containing 
the financials, rather than a presumption that he participated in the preparation of the 
financials, is a different question. See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text (discussing 
Howard v. Everex, 228 E3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
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Ninth Circuit "group pleading" rules should be revised; and (ii) the Second 
Circuit's "group pleading" rules should be completely overhauled. The 
more fundamental question is whether "group pleading" should survive 
at all. It is inconsistent with the PSLRA's overall emphasis on specific 
pleading and inconsistent with the discovery stay. It depends upon factual 
assumptions about the business world that judges have made without em-
pirical evidence as a guide and that experience suggests are false. Courts 
would do best to put this pleading protocol to the sword. 

